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Making Appearances Matter: 
Recusal and the Appearance of Bias
Dmitry Bam
In the United States, judges are required to recuse themselves—that 
is, remove themselves from participating in a case—not only when they
are biased, but even when they may appear biased to a neutral observer. 
This nominally strict, appearance-based recusal standard is intended to 
ensure the judge’s impartiality in resolving disputes, to protect the 
judiciary’s reputation, and to instill public confidence in the fairness of 
the courts. It has long been assumed that so long as the judge makes the 
correct recusal decision, the appearance of impartiality is restored and 
the reputation of the judiciary is protected. 
This Article challenges that long-standing assumption and argues
that the focus on appearances only at the time of the recusal decision, 
when the public has already formed its impressions of judicial
impartiality, may not fully restore public confidence and protect the 
reputation of the judiciary. In other words, a judge’s recusal decision 
may be too little and come too late. Moreover, when appearances are 
considered on a case-by-case basis, often by the very judge whose
impartiality has been challenged, even the correct nonrecusal decision 
does not always foster an appearance of impartiality. 
Most of the literature on recusal focuses on the recusal standard and 
the reasons why judges might, intentionally or unintentionally, reach the 
incorrect recusal decision, and seeks solutions to that problem. In this 
Article, I propose a new role that appearances should play in American
recusal jurisprudence, and a new approach to judicial recusal. I argue
that rather than allowing individual judges to consider appearances ex 
post (i.e., in the context of individual cases), legislators must consider 
appearances ex ante to prevent the damage to the judiciary from arising 
in the first instance. This means that legislators must regulate judicial 
selection (including judicial elections) and judicial conduct, as well as 
 Associate Professor, University of Maine School of Law; J.D. Stanford Law School. I 
want to thank Sarah Cravens, Nora Freeman Engstrom, Amanda Packel, and Deborah Rhode for 
their helpful comments. I am also grateful to a number of participants at the Fourth International
Legal Ethics Conference for their feedback and critiques. 
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extrajudicial conduct, with an eye towards potential future recusal. To 
that end, legislatures should create ethical rules and regulations
designed to eliminate any appearance of impartiality from arising. And, 
to the extent that recusal cannot be avoided by such ex ante regulation, 
legislatures must also consider appearances ex ante in creating and 
implementing new recusal procedures. 
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“We may try to see things as objectively as we please. Nonetheless, 
we can never see them with any eyes except our own.” 
—Judge Benjamin Cardozo1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Throughout this nation’s history, Americans have only sporadically 
paid close attention—or any attention—to judicial recusal. Recusal, 
which in certain circumstances requires a judge to step aside from 
hearing a case, is a doctrine that protects (some would say is crucial to 
protecting) both judicial impartiality and the appearance of impartiality. 
That a judge must be disinterested, and must appear disinterested, is 
universally accepted in American legal culture. But despite the centrality
of that notion in Western legal thought, the attention that recusal receives 
is often short-lived. The public temporarily takes notice of the issue 
when controversy arises, and in response to public outcry, state and 
federal legislatures, state supreme courts, and various bar associations
promulgate new rules and guidelines to govern judicial disqualification 
or, more often, revise the rules already in place.2 The issue then fades
from the public’s mind and lays quiescent until the cycle is repeated with 
a new high-profile incident. 
But the familiar on-again-off-again pattern has been broken in the 
last few years as recusal has steadily lingered in the national spotlight.
From the controversy surrounding Justice Scalia’s infamous duck-
hunting trip with then-litigant Dick Cheney,3 to the recent Supreme 
Court decision in Caperton v. A. T. Massey, 4 to the morerecent outcry
over a federal district judge’s decision to overturn a federal moratorium
on deep-sea drilling in the Deepwater Horizon controversy,5 to the 
1. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 13 (1921). 
2. The terms “recusal” and “disqualification” are used interchangeably throughout this 
Article. These terms originally had slightly different meanings, with “recusal” referring to 
withdrawal at the judge’s discretion and “disqualification” meaning exclusion by force of law, but 
this distinction is no longer recognized. John P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges In Support of the 
Bayh Bill, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 43, 45 (1970); see alsoRICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL 
DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES § 20.8 passim (2d ed. 2007). 
3. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for the D.C., 541 U.S. 913 (2004) (Scalia, J.). 
4. Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009). This case is discussed in 
greater detail throughout this Article. The underlying facts in Caperton were the basis for John 
Grisham’s best-selling novel The Appeal. 
5. On June 22, 2010, federal district judge Martin Feldman overturned President Obama’s
moratorium on deep-ocean oil well drilling. The president had imposed the moratorium in response
to the disaster in the gulf that spewed millions of barrels of crude oil into the Gulf of Mexico each 
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evenmorerecent debate about whether a reportedly homosexual federal 
district court judge should have recused himself from ruling on the 
constitutionality of California’s ban on gay marriage,6 judicial recusal 
has never been more in vogue.7 A federal appellate judge once
commented that recusal is the “topic du jour,” and this was before the 
spate of recent incidents dramatically shook the foundation of the judicial 
disqualification jurisprudence.8 While the aphorism that there is “no such 
thing as bad publicity” may be true in many aspects of modern popular 
culture, this is not the case when it comes to the judiciary. As the number 
of high-profile disqualification controversies continues to grow, the 
reputation of our courts is tarnished, and the public’s faith in judicial 
impartiality and independence erodes. 
There is potentially a silver lining to the cloud of negative publicity: 
as more people notice a problem, and it continues to capture their 
attention, more people tend to work on a solution. This has certainly been 
the case with judicial recusal. The Caperton decision has sparked, or at 
the very least rekindled, academic and political interest in judicial 
disqualification.9 Following on the heels of that decision, Congress held
hearings examining judicial recusals in light of Caperton, 10 states 
day. It was later discovered that Feldman owns (or owned) extensive stock in oil companies and oil
drilling corporations, including Allis-Chalmers and Exxon, although the stock appears to have been 
sold the very day that Judge Feldman issued his ruling. See Tennille Tracy, Groups Seek Judge’s
Removal in Drilling-Moratorium Case, WALL ST. J.,July 2, 2010, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704293604575343361857605650.html. 
6. See John C. Eastman, Should Judge Have Recused Himself on Prop. 8?,SFGATE.COM 
(Aug. 11, 2010), http://articles.sfgate.com/2010-08-11/opinion/22213940_1_parties-judge-walker­
new-trial. On June 14, 2011, Judge Ware denied the motion to disqualify Judge Vaughn Walker. See 
Howard Mintz, Judge Rejects Bid to Set Aside Proposition 8 Ruling, MERCURYNEWS.COM (June 14, 
2011, 10:09 PM), 
http://www.mercurynews.com/samesexmarriage/ci_18271537?source=rss&nclick_check. 
7. While this Article focuses on recusal rules in the United States, recusal has also received 
significant attention overseas. See, e.g., HUGO YOUNG, The Compromising of Lord Hoffman, 
inSUPPING WITH THE DEVILS: POLITICAL WRITING FROM THATCHER TO BLAIR 212–14 (2003). 
8. M. Margaret McKeown, Don’t Shoot the Canons Maintaining the Appearance of 
Propriety Standard, 7 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 45, 45 (2005). 
9. As of June 21, 2010, a Westlaw search for “Caperton and Massey” yields 172 hits in the 
JLR database. Interestingly, a search of the “ALLFEDS” (all federal cases) and “ALLSTATES” (all 
state cases) yields only 129 results, suggesting that the academic and scholarly interest in the case 
may outweigh its impact on the courts and subsequent litigation. This casts some doubt on the
Caperton dissenters’ prediction that the decision would open the floodgates for “Capertonmotions” 
and that the courts would be inundated with frivolous disqualification demands. 
10. On December 10, 2010, the House Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Courts and
Competition held a hearing entitled “Examining the State of Judicial Recusals after Caperton v. A.T.
Massey.” This is not the first time in recent years that Congress has paid attention to judicial recusal.
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grappled (and continue to grapple) with new recusal rules and 
procedures,11and law schools around the country have held conferences 
and symposia dedicated to Capertonand judicial ethics writ large.12 But 
despite this concerted effort, no large-scale, national disqualification 
reform looms on the horizon. The problem seems to be that while many
scholars and judges agree that something must be done, few agree on
precisely what that something should be.13 
There is, however,an overwhelming consensus on one point: When it 
comes to recusal, the focus is generally on the actual recusal decision— 
“What did the judge decide?” and “Was that decision correct?” In other 
words, scholars, judges, and politicians have historically concentrated on 
what I call “getting to recusal,” that is, creating and amending 
substantive recusal rules that require partial judges (whether that 
partiality is real or perceived) to step aside. And even though 
appearances play an important role in the law of judicial recusal, only at 
the point of the recusal decision are appearances and public perception 
considered. This results-oriented, outcome-based approach to recusal is 
not surprising—the final recusal decision is generally the most salient
part of the entire recusal process and one that figures most prominently 
Shortly after the controversy over Justice Scalia’s non-recusal in a case involving Vice President 
Dick Cheney, Democrats on the House Judiciary Committee called for hearings into possible
shortcomings of recusal laws that allowed Justice Scalia to hear a case after vacationing with one of 
the litigants. Senator Kerry asserted at the time that “[t]here is absolutely no question that when 
judges accept vacations and gifts from the parties before them it erodes public trust in the courts.” 
Josh Gerstein, Kerry Has Pressed a Long Campaign to Rein in Judges, N.Y. SUN, July 14, 2004, at 
1. 
11. West Virginia, Michigan, and Wisconsin are just a few of the states where contentious 
debate regarding the appropriate reaction to Caperton took place. For an article summarizing
reforms in the states following Caperton, see James Sample, Court Reform Enters the Post-Caperton 
Era, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 787 (2010). On June 27, 2011, New York issued new recusal rules for 
elected state judges, prohibiting those judges from hearing cases involving litigants—parties or
lawyers—who contributed over $2,500 to their campaigns. SeeRules Governing the Assignment of 
Cases Involving Contributors to Judicial Campaigns, RULES OF THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE 
OF THE COURTS §151.1, available at http://nycourts.gov/rules/chiefadmin/151.shtml#section151_1. 
12. See, e.g., Symposium, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 215 
(2010); Symposium, State Judicial Independence—A National Concern, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 559 
(2010); Symposium, Judicial Ethics and Accountability At Home and Abroad, 42 MCGEORGE L. 
REV. 1 (2010);Press Release, Georgetown Law School, State Courts and U.S. Supreme Court
Rulings: Will Caperton and Citizens United Change the Way States Pick Judges? (Jan. 19, 2010), 
available athttp://www.law.georgetown.edu/news/releases/January.26.2010.html. 
13. But see John A. Meiser, Note, The (Non)Problem of a Limited Due Process Right to 
Judicial Disqualification, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1799 (2009) (suggesting that national-level 
reforms to disqualification rules are unnecessary, and that the issue should be left to individual 
states). 
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in the public spotlight. After all, it was recusal decisions themselves that 
generally gave rise to the recusal-related controversies arising in the last 
decade. In turn, the focus on outcomes leads recusal reformers to proceed 
under a fundamentally flawed assumption that the problem can be solved 
by simply fashioning a new rule requiring a future judge to recuse under 
the same factual circumstances that may have led a present-day judge not 
to recuse. As a consequence of this assumption, substantive recusal 
standards have been continually revised and refined, while recusal 
procedures have remained stagnant. Additionally, the same assumption
(i.e., that recusal can eliminate the appearance of partiality created by the 
judicial conduct requiring recusal in the first place) has led scholars and 
politicians to pay little attention to regulating the underlying judicial 
conduct. 
In the pages that follow, I argue that this outcome-based approach is 
misguided when it comes to maximizing the appearance of judicial 
impartiality and judicial legitimacy. Focusing on the final recusal 
decision, and considering appearances only at the time of that decision, 
places too much emphasis on an aspect of recusal that may not be so 
important, at least when it comes to public confidence in the impartiality
and fairness of American courts. 
This Article recommends a two-part solution. The first part requires 
that attention shift awayfrom the outcome-based recusal jurisprudence
that focuses on the substantive recusal standard and the actual recusal 
decision. The second requires that attention shift toward the rules, 
regulations, and procedures that precede the recusal decision: namely, (1) 
ex ante regulation of judicial conduct and judicial selection that creates
the appearance of bias in the first place,14 and (2) new recusal procedures 
to govern the processes by which judges make recusal decisions. The 
recommended shift of attention to ex ante regulation of judicial conduct 
and appearance-based recusal procedures will promote the appearance of 
judicial impartiality. 
While at first glance recusal may seem like a narrow and obscure 
14. Unlike ex post solutions like judicial recusal, which seek to minimize the damage to the 
judiciary by removing judges when they may be perceived as biased, an ex ante solution in this
context consists of rules that minimize or eliminate the damage to the judiciary from occurring in the
first place. It may seem odd at first glance that in this Article about recusal, the key jurisprudential 
change that I recommend is not actually a change to recusal rules at all, but rather a new approach to
regulating judges and aspiring judges. Nonetheless, I hope to show that to maximize the appearance 
of impartiality, the time to think about recusal is before the appearance of bias arises in the first 
place. 
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topic within the larger field of judicial ethics and judicial impartiality, 
judicial recusal is a linchpin for the underlying proposition that a court
should be fair and impartial. Partly as a result of a poorly functioning
recusal scheme, public confidence in the legal system has waned, and 
people are rightly concerned about the impartiality of their courts.15 A 
“crisis of confidence” may be infecting our ideals of judicial 
impartiality.16 In light of the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in 
18Republican Party of Minnesota v. White17 and Citizens United v. FEC, 
recusal reform may be the best way—perhaps the only way—to deal 
with the appearance of partiality that can be created by large campaign 
contributions to a judge in the course of an election.19 As other 
safeguards of judicial impartiality have fallen by the wayside or been 
struck down by the Supreme Court, and as judicial elections have come 
to resemble legislative elections,finding a new approach to recusal 
becomes more and more crucial. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part II discusses the history of 
judicial recusal in the United States. This history shows the evolution of 
American thought about judicial recusal, from its common-law origins, 
when disqualification was required only if the judge had a pecuniary 
interest in the case, to the regime in place today,which requires recusal 
for a mere appearance of bias. I will also show how substantive recusal 
standards have evolved under the 
assumption that the substantive recusal rule is the key factor in creating 
the appearance of judicial impartiality. 
Part III starts with the proposition that the public’s perception of 
judicial conduct—the appearance of fairness and partiality—must be 
considered in recusal and disqualification rules and standards. It
nevertheless concludes that relying solely on the “appearance of bias” 
standard—an ex post standard that has largely been accepted by judges 
and scholars—fails to create an appearance of impartiality. I challenge 
15. Damon M. Cann& Jeff Yates, Homegrown Institutional Legitimacy Assessing Citizens’ 
Diffuse Support for State Courts, 36 AM. POL. RES. 297, 313 (2007). 
16. John Leubsdorf, Theories of Judging and Judge Disqualification, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 237, 
245 (1987). 
17. 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
18. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
19. Of course, another solution would be to eliminate judicial elections altogether. However, 
the public strongly supports judicial elections, and eliminating judicial elections at this time is
politically infeasible. 
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the long-accepted and virtually uncontroverted assumption that a judge’s 
recusal can eliminate the appearance of impartiality. To the contrary, I 
argue that the mere act of recusal is an ineffective way to restore the 
public’s confidence in the courts, in part because it comes much too late. 
Although the empirical data on this issue is very limited, some 
preliminary research suggests that once the public has perceived
conditions that create impartiality or bias, the recusal decision alone 
cannot fully restore public confidence. Furthermore, I argue that making 
appearance-based recusal decisions in individual cases on an ad hoc basis 
may not create an appearance of impartiality, no matter the substantive
standard. Both of these conclusions require substantially more empirical 
analysis, but this Article suggests that it is a field worth a closer look. 
Part IV proposes a solution: to maximize the appearance of 
impartiality and protect the reputation of the judiciary, we must 
implement ex ante regulations of judicial conduct that prevent the need 
for recusal altogether whenever possible. When recusal cannot be 
avoided, I propose the implementation of systemic, appearance-based 
procedural recusal rules. The appearance-based recusal procedures are
themselves the ends of my proposal, not the means by which we 
accomplish some other goal (namely, the “right” substantive result). And 
while I leave open the question of what specific ex ante rules and which 
particular recusal procedures do the most to maximize and restore the 
appearance of judicial impartiality, I conclude with some suggestions
about how my proposals could be implemented. 
II. JUDICIAL RECUSAL: PAST AND PRESENT 
The American legal system is based on a simple and 
noncontroversial proposition: a fair and neutral judge is essential to the 
operation of a just legal system. This maxim was recognized throughout 
the history of legal institutions, and, in some respects, the academic 
scholarship on the judiciary, and the judicial role is about advancing fair, 
impartial, and independent judges. Disqualification of unfair and non-
neutral judges is just one method commonly used to ensure impartiality
within the judiciary.20 After all, judges are human and often develop 
20. There are, of course, more draconian measures that can be used to remove biased or 
partial judges, including censure, reprimand, and impeachment. Often, these measures are reserved 
for judges who engage in blatant corruption or violate other ethical rules. See, e.g., Ian Urbina& 
Sean D. Hamill, Judges Plead Guilty in Scheme to Jail Youths for Profit, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2009, 
at A22, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/13/us/13judge.html?_r=1&adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1300986369­
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personal and professional relationships that may hinder their ability to 
preside over a dispute in a fair and impartial manner. This Part provides 
an overview of the history and development of recusal rules in the United 
States. The recusal scheme that exists in the United States today has its 
roots in English common law. Exploring the history of recusal rules and 
standards helps explain recent controversies surrounding judicial 
disqualification in state and federal courts. The discussion will also 
highlight the important role that appearances—public perception of the 
judiciary and confidence in the courts—play in current recusal 
jurisprudence. 
A. Roots 
Early Jewish and Roman law recognized the importance of judicial 
impartiality.21 In fact, medieval Jewish law prohibited judges from
participating in cases involving a friend or a kinsman,22 and the Roman
Code of Justinian provided for removal of judges for mere suspicion of 
bias.23 Similarly, English common law provided for replacement of a 
suspect judge and recognized the maxim that “no man ought to be a 
judge in his own cause.”24 But by the 18th century, the common-law 
recusal practice was exceedingly simple and highly constrained: only if 
he had a direct pecuniary interest in the case was the judge to be 
disqualified.25 
2HIFqUYyJrX5IElf75zRAQ. 
21. FLAMM, supra note2, § 1.2, at 5. Bracton set out the common law rule for disqualification 
in the thirteenth century: 
A justiciary may be refused for good cause, but the only cause for refusal is a suspicion, 
which arises from many causes, as if the judge be a blood relative of the plaintiff, his 
vassal or subject, his parent or friend, or an enemy of the tenant, his kinsman or a 
member of his household, or a table-companion, or he has been his counsellor or his 
pleader in that cause or in another, and in any such like capacity. 
6 HENRICIDEBRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUSANGLIE 249 (Travers Twisstrans., 1883). 
22. FLAMM, supra note 2, § 1.2, at 5 (citing THE CODE OF MAIMONIDES: BOOK FOURTEEN, 
THE BOOK OF JUDGES 68–70 (Julian Obermann et al. eds., Abraham M. Hershman trans., Yale Univ. 
Press 1949)). The Talmud, dating back to the third century, “created strict prohibitions on judges’ 
interactions with parties.” Jay Hall, Note, The Road Less Traveled  The Third Circuit’s Preservation
of Judicial Impartiality in an Imperfect World, 50 VILL. L. REV. 1265, 1268 (2005). 
23. Harrington Putnam, Recusation, 9 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 3 n.10 (1923). 
24. Dr. Bonham’s Case, [1610] 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (P.C.); accordTumey v. Ohio, 273 
U.S. 510, 525 (1927). 
25. John P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE L.J. 605, 609–12 (1947). The two
leading common law authorities for this proposition are the Sir Nicholas Bacon’s Case, [1563] 73 
Eng. Rep. 487, and the Earl of Derby’s Case, [1614] 77 Eng. Rep. 1390. 
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Commentators, including Blackstone, and English courts of that time
rejected the notion that a judge should be disqualified from hearing a 
case merely because he may be biased.26 This was largely due to the
then-prevalent respect for judges.27“[T]he law will not suppose a 
possibility of bias or favour in a judge,” Blackstone wrote,“who is 
already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority
greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.”28 Recusal was not 
required even when family members appeared as parties in front of a 
judge.29 
B. Judicial Disqualification in the United States 
Under the common law, and in the British Commonwealth even to 
this day, the law on judicial recusal is largely judge-made. In the United
States, federal and state legislation also play a key role in regulating
judicial disqualification. This is an important distinction, as this Article
will later argue that judges are not in the best position to regulate their 
own conduct, whether it comes to recusal procedures or to the 
substantive recusal standard. For now, however, let us examine the 
history and development of the standard. 
1. Federal recusal statutes 
Although the American Founders shared some of the English 
reverence for the judiciary, and American disqualification law grew
directly out of the common law tradition, American judges—at least 
American federal judges—have historically been held to a more stringent 
recusal standard than judges in England.30 Judges continue to take an 
oath swearing to administer justice “faithfully and impartially.”31 But in 
26. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES*361; Brookes v. Rivers, [1668] 145 Eng.
Rep. 569 (holding that a judge was not required to recuse himself in his brother-in-law’s case). 
27. Of course, one could argue it was also partly due to a lack of understanding of human 
nature and subconscious bias. SeePAUL BREST & LINDA HAMILTON KRIEGER, PROBLEM SOLVING, 
DECISION MAKING, AND PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT: A GUIDE FOR LAWYERS AND POLICYMAKERS 
267–301 (2010) (discussing biases in processing and judging information, including hindsight bias,
confirmation bias, and overconfidence). 
28. BLACKSTONE,supra note 26, at *361. 
29. Brookes, 145 Eng. Rep. at 569 (explaining that a judge need not recuse himself from a 
brother-in-law’s case because “favour shall not be presumed in a judge”). 
30. As I explain in greater detail below, while the substantive recusal standard has changed 
significantly since the common law, and we have a much greater understanding of both conscious 
and subconscious bias, the recusal procedures used in common law are still prevalent today. 
31. 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2006). Each judge and justice of the United States must take the 
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virtually every jurisdiction, financial interest is now only one of many
disqualifying factors, which also include familial and professional 
connections to the parties or their counsel, prejudice, partiality, bias, and 
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts.32 
Leading up to the American Revolution, colonists adopted the simple 
and narrow common law recusal rule described above. But shortly 
thereafter, in 1792, Congress passed the United States’ first recusal 
statute.33 It is unknown why Congress stepped into the fray so quickly, 
but the passage of the law was perhaps a sign of a concern that the
recusal issue should not be left entirely to judges. This initial legislation
was narrowly drawn and interpreted, and did not prohibit judges from 
hearing cases in which they might have a bias for or against a party.34 
Rather, the statute largely codified the common law disqualification rules 
and called for disqualification of a district court judge who was
“concerned in interest,” as well as judges who had “been of counsel for 
either party.”35 
Over the next two centuries, the federal recusal statute was amended
and shaped. The federal statute that governs recusals by federal judges 
today is 28 U.S.C. § 455.36 It is divided into two parts. Section 455(a) is 
a general catch-all provision that requires disqualification whenever a 
judge’s “impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”37 This standard
was intended to promote not only the impartiality of the judiciary but 
also the public perception of the impartiality of the judicial process.38 No 
following oath: 
“I, _____ _____, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will administer justice without
respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully
and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon me as 
________________ under the Constitution and laws of the United States. So help me 
God.” 
32. SeeFLAMM, supra note 2, chs. 23–27 (surveying disqualification rules in state and federal 
courts). 
33. Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 11, 1 Stat. 278–79 (amended by Act of Mar. 3, 1821, ch. 
51, 3 Stat. 643). 
34. Id. In other words, Congress did not entirely reject the simple recusal standard that was in 
place in England. 
35. Id. 
36. This statute is a descendant of the original 1792 statute, which was altered in 1821 by the 
Act of Mar. 3, 1821, ch. 51, 3 Stat. 643; in 1891 by the Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 23, § 21, 36 Stat.
1090; then again in 1911 by the Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 20, 36 Stat. 1087, 1090; and
recodified as 28 U.S.C. § 455 in 1948. 
37. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2006). 
38. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1453, at 5 (1974);see also S. REP. NO. 93-419, at 5 (1973); Liljeberg v. 
Health Serv. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 858 n.7 (1988) (“The general language of subsection 
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longer do we tolerate all non-financial bias by our judges. Instead, the 
statute is interpreted to proscribe even the appearance of bias, as viewed 
from the perspective of an objective observer. 
This appearance-based standard has been in place since the statute
was amended in 1974 and was intended to overrule the duty-to-sit 
doctrine, which suggested that close questions on disqualification issues 
should be resolved in favor of hearing the case.39Section 455(a) has been 
described by the Court as a “catchall” provision, covering all kinds of 
bias and prejudice, and requiring an objective evaluation rather than the 
earlier subjective standard.40 
Section 455(b), on the other hand, lists specific circumstances
requiring disqualification.41 Some consider the § 455(b) list as an a 
priori, per se determination of conditions that automatically satisfy the 
standard set forth in § 455(a), while others regard the list as a 
predetermined set of circumstances that involve actual bias rather than 
“the public perception of the judicial process.”42 Section 455(b) is 
(a) was designed to promote public confidence in the integrity of the judicial process by replacing 
the subjective ‘in his opinion’ standard with an objective test.”). 
39. Mark T. Coberly, Note, Caesar’s Wife Revisited—Judicial Disqualification After the
1974 Amendments, 34 WASH.& LEE L. REV. 1201, 1205 (1977). 
40. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 548 (1994); Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 870–71 
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
41. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b). Subsection 455(b)(1) requires a judge to recuse himself when he “has 
a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts
concerning the proceeding.”Id. § 455(b)(1). Subsection (b)(2) requires recusal “[w]here in private 
practice he served as lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom he previously 
practiced law served during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or such 
lawyer has been a material witness concerning [the matter in controversy].”Id. § 455(b)(2). 
Subsection (b)(3) requires recusal when the judge “has served in governmental employment and in 
such capacity participated as counsel, adviser or material witness concerning the proceeding or
expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the particular case in controversy.”Id. § 455(b)(3). 
Subsection (b)(4) demands recusal when the judge 
knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child residing in his 
household, has a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the 
proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of
the proceeding. 
Id. § 455(b)(4). Finally, subsection (b)(5) requires recusal when a spouse, or close relative, is a party 
in the proceeding or the lawyer to a party in the proceeding, has outside information regarding the
case in controversy, or stands to gain financially from the case’s outcome. Id. § 455(b)(5). 
42. Compare Leslie W. Abramson, Specifying Grounds for Judicial Disqualification in 
Federal Courts, 72 NEB. L. REV. 1046, 1049–50 (1993) (arguing that § 455(b) particularizes the 
grounds for disqualification that satisfy the catch-all standard of § 455(a)),with Herrington v. County 
of Sonoma, 834 F.2d 1488, 1502 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Section 455(b) covers situations in which an 
actual conflict of interest exists, even if there is no appearance of one.”) (emphasis omitted); see also 
Parker v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1510, 1527 (11th Cir. 1988). 
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implicated in cases involving allegations of personal bias or prejudice, or 
when the judge’s relationships and interests—including prior 
employment, family relationships, and financial interests—create a 
conflict of interest. In other words, unlike § 455(a), which focuses on 
how a reasonable person would perceive the judicial conduct, § 455(b)
addresses circumstances that are likely (in the eyes of the legislature) to 
create actual bias towards a party to the litigation. 
Despite numerous amendments, each broadening and expanding the 
disqualification standards, judges have always interpreted the statute
narrowly.43 This is partly because judges apply the law to themselves, 
and most judges hesitate to admit that they are so biased or so interested 
in a case as to be unable to render a fair, impartial decision. Research in 
cognitive psychology has recognized various biases that may affect 
judicial decisionmaking on recusal, including unconscious bias and self-
serving bias.44 In addition, the judge-created “duty to sit” doctrine 
encouraged judges to err on the side of remaining on a case even when 
there was a strong argument in favor of recusal.45 
Judicial reluctance to acknowledge bias is only part of the reason
why federal recusal statutes have had only limited success. Bias is a 
difficult concept to define. Generally, bias isdefined as an “[i]nclination;
prejudice,predilection; a preconceived opinion; a predisposition to decide 
a cause or an issue in a certain way, which does not leave the mind
perfectly open to conviction.”46Unfortunately, the attempts to draw
bright lines for judges to follow have focused predominantly on judges’ 
financial interests at the expense of all other interests.47In fact, the
disclosures required of all federal judges address only financial 
holdings.48The focus on financial interests is understandable since 
43. Amanda Frost, Keeping Up Appearances A Process-Oriented Approach to Judicial 
Recusal, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 531, 540–41 (2005). 
44. Deana A. Pollard, Unconscious Bias and Self-Critical Analysis  The Case for a Qualified 
Evidentiary Equal Employment Opportunity Privilege, 74 WASH. L. REV. 913 (1999) (discussing 
unconscious bias); see also Robert A. Prentice, The Case of the Irrational Auditor A Behavioral 
Insight into Securities Fraud Litigation, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 133, 143–80 (2000) (discussing self-
serving bias). 
45. Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 837 (1972) (emphasis omitted). 
46. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 171 (9th ed. 2009). 
47. A judge must recuse himself when “[h]e knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or 
his spouse or minor child residing in his household, has a financial interest in the subject matter in 
controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4) (2000). Financial interest is defined as “ownership of a legal or 
equitable interest, however small”Id. § 455(d)(4). 
48. See Ethics in Government Act, §§ 101–102, 5 U.S.C. app. 4 (2000); see also Richard 
Carelli, Judges’ Financial Reports Hit Web, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 22, 2000. 
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financial interests are generally easier to define and identify.
Furthermore, the popularity of law and economics—which claims that 
wealth maximization motivates human behavior—shifts the emphasis 
even more to a judge’s financial ties. 
A second recusal statute, codified as 28 U.S.C. § 144, allows
litigants to seek disqualification of a district court judge for any alleged 
bias or prejudice and establishes a broader recusal standard. Under this 
statute, judges have limited discretion about whetherto recuse; litigants 
need only file an affidavit alleging sufficient facts to infer a judge’s 
prejudice.49 Once such an affidavit is filed, the facts contained in the 
affidavit are presumptively valid, and a judge is automatically 
disqualified from the case.50 In Berger v. United States, the Supreme 
Court explained that this statute prohibits a judge from 
ruling on the truth of the allegations in a party’s affidavit, requiring
disqualification so long as the affidavit isfacially sufficient.51 
However, judges have adopted a narrow definition of prejudice and 
continue to review the affidavit to determine whether the litigants have
satisfied the statutory requirements.52 In other words, the very judge 
whose fairness is under review rules on the sufficiency of the affidavit. 
Professor Frank has explained: 
Frequent escape from the statute has been effected through narrow
construction of the phrase “bias and prejudice.” Affidavits are found 
not “legally sufficient” on the ground that the specific acts mentioned 
do not in fact indicate “bias and prejudice,” a reasoning which 
emasculates the Berger decision by transferring the point of conflict.53 
49. Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22 (1921). 
50. SeeFLAMM, supra note 2, § 25.2.1, at 721 (“On its face § 144 appears to be a peremptory 
disqualification provision, and there is little doubt that it was originally intended to be one.”). 
51. 255 U.S. at 36. 
52. See Debra Lyn Bassett, Judicial Disqualification in the Federal Courts, 87 IOWA L. REV. 
1213, 1224 (2002). 
53. Frank, supra note 25, at 629. Countervailing a judge’s duty to recuse was a 
judiciallycreated “duty to sit,” first articulated by the Fifth Circuit. Edwards v. United States, 334
F.2d 360, 362 n.2 (5th Cir. 1964). That court explained that “[i]t is a judge’s duty to refuse to sit 
when he is disqualified but it is equally his duty to sit when there is no valid reason for
recusation.”Id. The “duty to sit” provided the ammunition for judges to err on the side of nonrecusal,
even when recusal was arguably justified. Although the duty to sit doctrine was eventually accepted 
by all circuits, see Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 837 (1972), the duty to sit has now largely been 
rejected. 
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2. ABA Code of Judicial Conduct 
While 28 U.S.C. §§ 455 and 144 control only in federal courts,54 
nearly every state has adopted the American Bar Association’s Code of 
Judicial Conduct. 55 The Code, therefore, governs judicial 
disqualification in almost all American state courts56 and applies to all
full-time judges and all legal and quasi-legal proceedings.57 
Rule 2.11 of the 2007 Code states: “A judge shall disqualify himself 
or herself in any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned . . . .”58 Impartiality is defined as the “absence 
of bias or prejudice in favor of, or against, particular parties or classes of 
parties, as well as maintenance of an open mind in considering issues 
that may come before the judge.”59 In many ways, disqualification under 
the Coderesembles disqualification under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a): both have 
been interpreted to impose an appearance-based disqualification
standard.60 Both also leave judges with broad discretion in interpreting
54. The Code of Judicial Conduct does not apply to the Justices of the United States Supreme
Court, although the Supreme Court looks to the Code for guidance. See Caprice L. Roberts, The Fox 
Guarding the Henhouse? Recusal and the Procedural Void in the Court of Last Resort, 57 
RUTGERS L. REV. 107, 111 (2004). In light of recent controversies surrounding recusal of Supreme 
Court Justices, including Justices Scalia and Thomas, some commentators and law professors have 
called on the Court to adopt the Code for itself or for Congress to impose such adoption upon the 
Court. 
55. The original Canons of Judicial Ethics were adopted in 1924 by the House of Delegates 
of the American Bar Association and ultimately by a majority of the states over the course of the 
next five decades. The House of Delegates adopted more explicit standards for judicial conduct in 
1972 and ultimately adopted a revised Model Code of Judicial Conduct in 1990. That Code was 
superseded by a revised Code adopted in February 2007 by the ABA House of Delegates. The 2007 
revision is available at http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/ABA_MCJC_approved.pdf. 
56. Forty-nine states have adopted the Code in one form or another. Leslie W. Abramson, 
Appearance of Impropriety Deciding When a Judge’s Impartiality “Might Reasonably Be
Questioned,” 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 55, 55 (2000). 
57. The Code of Conduct for United States Judges is another ethical code that applies to most 
federal judges and is largely similar to the ABA Model Code. The Code, adopted and revised by the 
Judicial Conference of the United States, does not govern the Justices of the United States Supreme 
Court because the Conference has no authority to create rules controlling the Supreme Court. See 
Richard K. Neumann, Jr., Conflicts of Interest in Bush v. Gore Did Some Justices Vote Illegally?, 
16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 375, 386 (2006). 
58. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT2.11 (2007). The rule goes on to list specific 
situations where the likelihood of prejudice or its appearance is presumed, although the list is not
exhaustive. 
59. Id. 
60. Abramson, supra note 56, at 55 n.2 (“Whether a judge’s impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned is also referred to as the appearance of partiality, appearance of impropriety, or negative 
appearances.”). 
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and applying this standard, and judges have exploited this discretion to 
downplay the potential for an appearance of bias.61 I discuss 
disqualification of state and federal judges interchangeably, as any 
distinctions between the two are generally inapposite for the purposes of 
this Article. 
C. Recusal Under the Due Process Clause 
In addition to the federal statutes and the state judicial codes, the 
Constitution’s Due Process Clause guarantees litigants a right to have 
their cases heard and decided by fair and impartial judges.62 The
Supreme Court has held that a biased judge violates the litigant’s
constitutional rights, requiring either a new trial or a new hearing on 
appeal without the tainted judge’s presence.63 These holdings, however, 
are exceptions rather than the rule, and it has long been thought that the 
Constitution mandates disqualification in only very limited 
circumstances. The Supreme Court has explained that “matters of 
kinship, personal bias, state policy, remoteness of interest would seem 
generally to be matters merely of legislative discretion” rather than a 
constitutional recusal floor.64 For decades, it was thought that recusal 
was mandated under the Due Process Clause in only two circumstances: 
(1) when the judge has a financial interest in one of the parties; or (2)
when the judge presides over a criminal contempt hearing after presiding
over an earlier hearing in which the contemptuous behavior took place. 
But in Caperton, the Supreme Court held that recusal is also mandated 
when the judge’s relationship with one of the litigants creates a 
probability of bias.65 Although Caperton involved a judge who decided a 
case involving a supporter of the judge’s election bid, the holding of the 
case does not appear to be limited to the electoral context.66 Nonetheless, 
it remains to be seen whether Caperton will change recusal analysis
under the Due Process Clause, or if it will be a one-off case limited to its 
facts. These three categories of recusal—the two classic standards, and 
the new Caperton standard—are discussed in greater detail below. 
61. Debra Lyn Bassett, Recusal and the Supreme Court, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 657, 680 (2005). 
62. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. 
63. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (“A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic
requirement of due process.”). 
64. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927) (citing Wheeling v. Black, 25 W. Va. 266, 270
(1884)). 
65. Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009). 
66. See id.at 2257, 2267. 
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1. Financial interest 
The first situation where the Due Process Clause requires 
disqualification is when the judge may benefit financially depending on
the outcome of the case. In the leading case,Tumey v. State of Ohio, an 
Ohio statute authorized a mayor to preside over cases as a judge.67 The 
mayor then received court costs assessed against a convicted defendant, 
but not an acquitted one. The Court held that this incentive scheme 
threatened judicial impartiality and invalidated the statute on due process 
grounds, explaining that due process is violated when a judge is “paid for 
his service only when he convicts the defendant.”68 In its holding, the
Court relied on the common law rule that a judge may not have a “direct, 
personal, substantial pecuniary interest” in the case.69 That rule has its
origins in the maxim that no person is allowed to be “a judge in his own 
cause, because his interest would certainly bias his judgment,and . . . 
corrupt his integrity.”70 This result is neither controversial nor surprising; 
a judge should not receive “contingency fees” for convicting a 
defendant.71 
A judge’s interest need not be a direct financial one to violate due 
process. For example, in Ward v. Village of Monroeville the Court held 
that a mayor could not preside as a judge over ordinance violations and 
traffic offenses when contributions to the town’s budget came from the 
fines assessed by the court.72 While the mayor’s salary did not depend on 
his conviction rate, the mayor still had a financial incentive to convict; he 
was responsible for the town’s revenue production. That incentive, held 
the Court, is inconsistent with due process.73 
Similar incentives were held to violate due process in Aetna Life
Insurance Co. v. Lavoie. 74 There, an Alabama Supreme Court justice 
ruled in favor of the plaintiff on his bad faith claim against Aetna. It 
turned out, however, that the same judge had filed two nearly identical 
67. Tumey, 273 U.S. at 510. 
68. Id. at 531. 
69. Id. at 523. 
70. THE FEDERALIST NO.10 (James Madison). 
71. Ronald D. Rotunda, Judicial Disqualification in the Aftermath of Caperton v. A.T. 
Massey Coal Co., 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 247, 249 (2010). 
72. 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972). Between 1964 and 1968, the fines, forfeitures, costs, and fees 
that the court had imposed provided nearly one-half of the village’s annual revenue. Id. at 58. 
73. Id.at 60 (“The mayor’s executive responsibilities [sic] for village finances may make him 
partisan to maintain the high level of contribution from the mayor’s court.”). 
74. 475 U.S. 813, 825 (1986). 
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actions against other insurance companies making similar allegations and 
seeking punitive damages.75 Those cases were still pending in Alabama’s 
lower courts at the time the Aetna case was decided. The Supreme Court 
held that the justice’s refusal to recuse violated the Due Process Clause.
Without deciding whether the justice was in fact influenced by his 
pending cases, the Court explained that the circumstances “would offer a 
possible temptation to the average judge to lead him to not to [sic] hold 
the balance nice, clear and true.”76 In other words, recusal was necessary 
not because of the justice’s ill will towards insurance companies, but 
rather because his decision “had the clear and immediate effect of 
enhancing both the legal status and the settlement value of his own 
case.”77 As with Tumeyand Ward, the judge could have used his position 
on the bench to further his own financial interests, acting as “a judge in 
his own case.”78 
In short, before Caperton, the “interested judge” category was fairly 
straightforward: if the judge could be linked to any financial interest, 
disqualification was required. The common thread in all of these cases 
was that the presiding judge derived a direct or indirect benefit by ruling 
in favor of one of the litigants. 
2. Criminal contempt 
The second disqualification category that falls within the confines of 
the Due Process Clause does not involve any financial interest to the 
judge. Instead, the Court has held that the due process forbids a judge 
from wearing too many hats. For example, in In re Murchison, the Court 
found a violation of the Due Process Clause although the judge did not 
have a personal pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case.79There, the 
Court set aside contempt convictions and held that it is a violation of due 
process for the same judge to serve as the one-person grand jury and then 
preside over a contempt proceeding related to the grand jury hearing.80 
Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, which followed In re Murchison, is also 
75. Id. at 817. 
76. Id. at 825 (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927)). 
77. Id. at 824. 
78. Id.; see also Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 579 (1973) (holding that an 
administrative board made up of optometrists was disqualified from presiding over a hearing against 
competing optometrists). 
79. 349 U.S. 133 (1955). 
80. Id. 
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instructive.81 In Mayberry, the defendant, in the course of trial, verbally
attacked the presiding judge82 and continuously interrupted court, to the
point where Mayberry had to be removed from the courtroom.83 The
Supreme Court held that when the defendant faces criminal contempt 
charges he “should be given a public trial before a judge other than the 
one reviled by the contemnor.”84 Again, disqualification was necessary
because of the interaction between the judge and the defendant prior to 
the contempt hearing.85 The Court explained that a “vilified” judge 
“necessarily becomes embroiled in a running, bitter controversy. No one 
so cruelly slandered is likely to maintain that calm detachment necessary
for fair adjudication.”86 
3. Caperton v. Massey 
This was the state of recusal law under the Due Process Clause until 
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.87 In that case, West Virginia Supreme 
Court Justice Benjamin cast the deciding vote in favor of the appellant, 
Massey, whose CEO, Don Blankenship, was an extremely generous 
supporter of Justice Benjamin in the previous West Virginia Supreme 
Court election campaign. Blankenship contributed more to Benjamin’s 
campaign than all other donors combined, all while his attorneys were 
preparing the Caperton case for an appeal.88 Justice Benjamin refused
Caperton’s recusal request and voted with the majority in a three–two 
decision overturning the trial court’s verdict.89 The Supreme Court 
81. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 465 (1971). 
82. Defendant referred to the judge as a “hatchet man for the State,” a “dirty sonofabitch,” 
and a “dirty, tyrannical old dog.”Id. at 456–57. 
83. Id. at 462. 
84. Id. at 466. The same rule applies when a trial judge, following trial, punishes a lawyer for 
contempt committed during trial without giving that lawyer an opportunity to be heard in defense or 
mitigation. See Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 499–500 (1974). In such circumstances, a different 
judge should conduct the contempt trial in place of the judge who initiated the contempt. 
85. Mayberry, 400 U.S. at 465. 
86. Id. 
87. 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009). 
88. During the campaignBlankenship spent approximately $3 million to help Justice 
Benjamin. However, only $1000, the West Virginia limit for direct campaign contributions, was 
given directly to Benjamin’s campaign. The rest of the money (i) funded a tax-exempt organization,
Andfor the Sake of the Kids, which was formed to defeat incumbent Justice McGraw, and (ii) was
spent on newspaper and television advertising attacking McGraw. See Brief for Petitioners at 6–8, 
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) (No. 08-22). 
89. Id. at 2. The case’s long history and factual background is not relevant for the purposes of 
this Article. It should be noted, however, that recusal played a prominent role in the case’s
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reversed, holding that Justice Benjamin’s failure to recuse violated 
Caperton’s right to due process. 
After Caperton, there is little doubt that recusal is required under the 
Due Process Clause even when the judge has no personal interest in the 
outcome of the litigation and did not act as both a judge and a prosecutor
or witness in the same case. It remains to be seen, however, whether this 
case is a trendsetter and will change the way that states approach judicial
recusal, or if it is simply an outlier that will have limited jurisprudential 
effect. Some have suggested that the Caperton holding is fairly narrow, 
requiring a judge to recuse “himself because of campaign contributions 
or independent expenditures by an individual who is not a lawyer or 
party before the Court but has an interest in a case that is before the 
court.”90 And Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion takes great pains to 
convey the limited precedential effect of the Court’s decision. The 
opinion describes the situation as “exceptional” and “extreme;”91 so 
exceptional, in fact, that “[a]pplication of the constitutional standard 
implicated in this case will thus be confined to rare instances.”92 
But there is no reason to believe that the decision is limited solely to 
the campaign contribution context. Rather, the Caperton test may be 
satisfied, and disqualification may be required, even outside the universe 
of judicial elections and campaign contributions. For example, the Court 
accepted the notion that Justice Benjamin “would nevertheless feel a debt 
of gratitude to Blankenship for his extraordinary efforts to get him 
elected.”93 There is nothing in that notion—the idea of a debt of 
gratitude—that is limited to judicial elections. Would a federal judge feel 
a debt of gratitude to the president who selected her? Or perhaps to the 
judge’s former colleague at a large law firm who helped the judge in 
some life endeavor? How the lower courts interpret the Supreme Court’s
decision in Caperton will be one of the most important trends to follow
procedural history. After Benjamin cast the deciding vote in the original appeal, Blankenship’s
relationship with yet another justice on the West Virginia Supreme Court drew substantial public
attention when photographs surfaced showing Blankenship and Justice Elliott Maynard vacationing 
together on the French Riviera. John Gibeaut, Caperton’s Coal The Battle over an Appalachian 
Mine Exposes a Nasty Vein in Bench Politics, 95 A.B.A. J. 52, 56 (2009). As a result of the 
controversy, Justice Maynard recused himself from the case. Id. At around the same time, Justice 
Larry Starcher, a critic of Massey and Blankenship, also recused himself from the case. Id. 
90. Rotunda, supra note 711, at 256. 
91. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2263, 2265, 2267. 
92. Id. at 2267. 
93. Id. at 2262. 
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in the area of judicial ethics. 
D. Recent Incidents 
Recusal has garnered national headlines on many occasions over the 
last few decades. Judges have been denied appointments to the Supreme 
Court,94 suspended,95 and have faced other sanctions and general
opprobrium for their recusal-related misconduct.96 But in the last decade 
alone, five current Supreme Court Justices—Justice Scalia, along with 
Justices Thomas,97 Ginsburg,98 Roberts,99 and Alito100—have been 
94. When President Nixon nominated Judge Clement Haynsworth to the United States 
Supreme Court,his failure to recuse ultimately led to his nomination being defeated. First,
Haynsworth’s opponents pointed out that he sat on an important labor case involving the Deering 
Milliken Darlington Manufacturing Company while owning stock in a vending company that 
installed and serviced vending machines in the Deering plants. See Peter W. Bowie, The Last 100 
Years An Era of Expanding Appearances, 48 S. TEX. L. REV. 911, 929–30 (2007). The Senate 
Judiciary Committee closely scrutinized Judge Haynsworth’s interest in the vending company and its 
relations with Deering. Id. at 930.Later, it was learned that Haynsworth purchased stock in the
Brunswick Corporation while a case involving Brunswick was under submission, after oral argument 
and before the draft decision was circulated. Frank, supra note 2, at 56. Haynsworth did not recuse
himself. In large part due to his improper conduct on the bench and failure to recuse himself in the 
Deeringand Brunswick cases, Haynsworth’s nomination was denied by the Senate. See Bowie, 
supra, at 930. 
95. For example, the Tenth Circuit suspended District Judge Stephen Chandler from all 
judicial duties after he refused to recuse himself in two cases. Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S.
74 (1970). 
96. See generallyJOHN P. MACKENZIE, THE APPEARANCE OF JUSTICE 236–252 (1974); 
Andrew J. Lievense&Avern Cohn, The Federal Judiciary and the ABA Model Code The Parting of 
Ways, 28 JUST. SYS. J. 271 (2007). 
97. Justice Thomas’s wife, Virginia Thomas, is alleged to have ties to the Tea Party and has 
been active in conservative politics. Recently, House Democrats called for Justice Thomas to recuse
himself from hearing any challenge to the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act. See Huma
Khan, Should Supreme Court Justices Clarence Thomas, Elena Kagan Sit Out Health Care
Case?,ABC NEWS(Mar. 22, 2011, 3:01 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/supreme-court-justice­
clarence-thomas-sit-health-care/story?id=12878346. 
98. The controversy stemmed from her involvement with the National Organization of
Women Legal Defense and Education Fund. In light of her involvement, thirteen Republican 
Congressmen demanded that Justice Ginsburg recuse herself from all future abortion cases. GOP
Lawmakers Ask Ginsburg to Withdraw from Abortion Cases,L.A. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2004, at A15. 
99. Justice Roberts was questioned about his continued involvement in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 
after he was approached about a potential nomination to the United States Supreme Court. The case 
was considered to be important to the President, and some scholars have commented that Roberts
should have recused himself from Hamdan after he learned that he was being considered for the 
nomination to the Supreme Court. See Ronald D. Rotunda, The Propriety of a Judge’s Failure to 
Recuse When Being Considered for Another Position, 19GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1187 (2006). 
100. While he was a judge on the Third Circuit, Justice Alito sat on a case in which Vanguard, 
a mutual fund management firm in which he had invested, was a party. Judge Alito wrote the 
opinion affirming dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim. R. Jeffrey Smith, Judge Participated in 2002 
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embroiled in recusal-related controversies. Justice Scalia’s denial of 
plaintiffs’ recusal request in Cheney v. United States District Court is 
perhaps the most controversial incident in the last decade.101In the
underlying action, plaintiffs sought discovery regarding an Energy 
Advisory Panel that was convened by then-Vice President Dick Cheney. 
When the issue reached the Supreme Court, one of the plaintiffs asked 
Justice Scalia to recuse himself because while the appeal was pending, 
Scalia and Cheney took a duck-hunting trip together. Justice Scalia 
denied the recusal motion, concluding that his impartiality could not 
reasonably be questioned.102 
Even before the Supreme Court’s Caperton decision, Judge 
McKeown called judicial recusal the “topic du jour.”103 But despite all
this controversy,“the theoretical underpinnings of American judicial 
disqualification jurisprudence remain murky, . . . unsettled, . . . and 
replete with inconsistencies.”104 Recusal experts have commented that 
“judicial disqualification frequently is subjective, random, and 
arbitrary,”105 and that “disqualification law is a sprawling patchwork, as 
thin as it is wide.”106 Although judicial bias and recusal have always 
been issues of considerable importance, recusal has recently taken on an 
even greater significance that demands immediate scholarly attention. As 
judicial elections become “noisier, nastier and costlier,” recusal becomes 
more and more important to minimize the judicial bias created in the 
course of judicial elections.107 
This transformation of judicial elections is no minor point. The
Supreme Court’s decisions in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White108 
and Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission109 are part of the
Vanguard Case Despite Promise to Recuse, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 2005, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/31/AR2005103101686.html 
101. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for the D.C., 541 U.S. 913 (2004) (Scalia, J.). 
102. Id. at 929. 
103. McKeown, supra note 8, at 45. 
104. FLAMM, supra note 2, § 1.6, at 14. 
105. JEFFREY M. SHAMAN &JONA GOLDSCHMIDT, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: AN 
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF JUDICIAL PRACTICES AND ATTITUDES 4–5 (1995). 
106. Deborah Goldberg et al.,The Best Defense Why Elected Courts Should Lead Recusal 
Reform, 46 WASHBURN L.J. 503, 517–18 (2007). 
107. Roy A. Schotland, Elective Judges’ Campaign Financing Are State Judges’ Robes the 
Emperor’s Clothes of American Democracy?, 2 J.L. & POL. 57, 76 (1985). 
108. 536 U.S. 765, 794 (2002) (striking down a Minnesota judicial canon that prohibited 
candidates for judicial office from announcing their views on legal issues). 
109. 130 S. Ct. 876, 886 (2010) (holding that federal restrictions on corporate independent
expenditures and electioneering communications are unconstitutional). 
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recent trend that has seen judicial elections come to resemble legislative 
elections. Over 70 percent of Americans believe that judges receiving 
campaign contributions are not impartial in litigation involving those 
contributors,110 and numerous empirical studies demonstrate that judges
tend to rule in favor of their campaign contributors.111 Even judges do
not believe that their colleagues can be impartial when dealing with those 
who helped them get elected.112 In this legal environment, recusal is 
necessary to ensure that bias stemming from judicial campaign 
contributions and judicial elections is minimized. In fact, judicial recusal 
may be the only way to deal with the appearances of partiality created 
when judges accept contributions from lawyers and persons who 
ultimately appear as litigants in front of the judge. 
III. IS GETTING IT RIGHT ENOUGH? 
As the discussion above shows, most jurisdictions in the United 
States have implemented recusal standards that revolve primarily around 
the appearance of impartiality. That is, in determining whether a judge 
should be disqualified from hearing a case, the challenged judge’s actual 
state of mind is largely irrelevant; the recusal decision hinges on the 
perceptions of “a reasonable person knowing all the relevant facts.”113 
This standard is intended “to protect the . . .appearance of 
impartiality.”114 Of course, recusal is also required in the event the judge 
is actually biased, but rarely does a disqualification inquiry turn on a 
judge’s actual bias.115 Cases of actual bias are rare, in part because an 
110. SeeGREENBERG QUINLAN ROSNER RESEARCH INC., JUSTICE AT STAKE FREQUENCY
QUESTIONNAIRE 4 (2001), available at http://www.gqrr.com/articles/1617/1412_JAS_ntlsurvey.pdf; 
ZOGBY INT’L FOR THE JUSTICE AT STAKE CAMPAIGN, MARCH 2004 SURVEY HIGHLIGHTS: 
AMERICANS SPEAK ON JUDICIAL ELECTIONS (2004), available at 
http://www.soros.org/initiatives/usprograms/focus/transparency/articles_publications/publications/ju 
sticeatstake_20040506/c_zogby_summary.pdf; see also David E. Pozen, The Irony of Judicial
Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 305 (2008). 
111. Joanna M. Shepherd, Money, Politics, and Impartial Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 623, 623
(2009) (finding a “strong relationship between campaign contributions and judges’ rulings” and 
demonstrating that elected judges “routinely adjust their rulings to attract votes and campaign 
money”); Stephen J. Ware, Money, Politics and Judicial Decisions  A Case Study of Arbitration Law 
in Alabama, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 583, 584 (2002); Margaret S. Williams & Corey A. Ditslear, 
Bidding for Justice The Influence of Attorneys’ Contributions on State Supreme Courts, 28 JUST. 
SYS. J. 135, 136 (2007). 
112. Pozen, supranote 110, at 305. 
113. Roberts v. Bilar, 625 F.2d 125, 129 (6th Cir. 1980). 
114. United States v. Gipson, 835 F.2d 1323, 1325 (10th Cir. 1988). 
115. In Caperton, the Supreme Court held that a judge must recuse himself when there is a 
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“affirmative finding of actual bias requires direct evidence or a very 
strong inference that the judge was so predisposed against a party that he 
or she had an entirely closed mind.”116 Indeed, the appearance-of-bias
test came into existence to address the problems inherent in a 
disqualification rule that either requires the litigant to show that the judge 
is “actually biased” or demands that the judge so conclude on her 
own.While some scholars and judges have criticized the appearance-
based substantive recusal standard, few people dispute that appearances
are important to the American judiciary and are a valid, if not a 
compelling, consideration in setting rules to govern judicial 
disqualification.117 Alexander Hamilton observed that the judicialbranch 
has “no influence, over either the sword or the purse.”118 
Policymakers today appreciate that judges lack both electoral 
legitimacy and political force, making the judiciary’s success depend in 
large part on the public’s acceptance of its authority.119 Without such
acceptance, a judicial proclamation carries no weight, and court rulings
probability of actual bias. I have previously argued that the probability-based rule announced in 
Caperton is different and distinct from the appearance-based rule contained in the federal recusal 
statute and the state judicial codes. See generally Dmitry Bam, Understanding Caperton Judicial
Disqualification Under the Due Process Clause, 42 MCGEORGE L. REV. 65 (2010). Others, 
including Justice Ginsburg, disagree. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 34–35, Caperton v. A.T
Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) (No. 08-22), available at 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-22.pdf (“I was taking 
appearance, likelihood, probability as all synonyms . . . .”);cf. Gerard J. Clark, Caperton’sNew Right 
to Independence in Judges, 59 DRAKE L. REV. 661, 707 (2010) (“The Court’s due process standard,
however, is really no different than the standards in recusal statutes and judicial codes.”); Terri R. 
Day, Buying Justice Caperton v. A.T. Massey Campaign Dollars, Mandatory Recusal and Due 
Process, 28 MISS. C. L. REV. 359, 370 (2009) (discussing the terms “appearance,”“perception,” and
“probability” and treating  them as synonymous); 
116. GRANT HAMMOND, JUDICIAL RECUSAL: PRINCIPLES, PROCESS AND PROBLEMS 17 
(2008). 
117. For criticism, see Ronald D. Rotunda, Judicial Ethics, the Appearance of Impropriety, 
and the Proposed New ABA Judicial Code, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1337, 1340–41 (2006) (arguing that 
appearance-based standards for judicial conduct are too vague to protect the judiciary); Raymond J. 
McKoski, Judicial Discipline and the Appearance of Impropriety What the Public Sees Is What the 
Judge Gets, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1914 (2010). Despite the fact that both authors criticize the 
“appearance of impropriety” standard, neither appears to question that appearances themselves are 
important for a successful and well-functioning judiciary. My proposal in this Article gets around 
many of the problems identified by Rotunda and McKoski by taking the appearance inquiry out of
the hands of individual judges and allowing appearances to be considered ex ante, only in 
implementing rules of judicial conduct and recusal procedures. 
118. THE FEDERALIST NO.78, at 425 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898). 
119. See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962). 
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are routinely ignored.120 If the public lacks confidence in the impartiality
of judges, or worse, refuses to comply with judicial decisions voluntarily, 
the notion that “we are a government of laws” would necessarily 
collapse. If for no other reason, courts should be protective of their 
reputation from public outrage and rejection for the sake of self­
preservation.121 
Just as policymakers recognize the importance of appearances and 
public perception in setting recusal standards, judges acknowledge that
the success of the judiciary hinges in large part on public confidence— 
the people’s faith—in the impartiality, independence, and accountability
of the judiciary. Justice John Paul Stevens once said,“[i]t is confidence in 
the men and women who administer the judicial system that is the true
backbone of the rule of law.”122 The Supreme Court has stressed the
importance of appearances, stating that “our system of law has always 
endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness” and that “to 
perform its high function in the best way ‘justice must satisfy the 
appearance of justice.’”123 Appearance of fairness, in other words, is as 
important as fairness itself.124 Thus, in considering the effectiveness of a 
recusal scheme, impartiality is only part of the equation; appearance of 
impartiality and appearance of justice are perhaps just as important.125 
But even if one starts with the assumption that appearances should
continue to play a key role in recusal jurisprudence, we must still ask 
how and when appearances should be considered, what role public
perception should play, and whether certain rules indeed foster the 
public’s confidence in the judiciary or, to the contrary, impede it. This is 
where current recusal jurisprudence goes astray. Despite my enthusiastic 
support for the consideration of appearances in judicial disqualification
jurisprudence, I argue that scholars writing about recusal, as well as 
120. MACKENZIE, supra note 96, atix. There are many nations where judges’ rulings are 
routinely ignored and many others where the judiciary is held in disrepute because of its lack of
independence, rampant corruption, or other forces. 
121. Id. 
122. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 128 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Baker v. Carr, 
369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s authority—possessed of neither 
the purse nor the sword—ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its moral sanction.”). 
123. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 
14 (1954)). 
124. Ex parte Bryant, 682 So. 2d 39, 41 (Ala. 1996). 
125. Cf. Randall J. Litteneker, Comment, Disqualification of Federal Judges for Bias or 
Prejudice, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 236, 267 (1978) (identifying the importance of “a judicial system that 
not only is impartial in fact, but also appears to render disinterested justice”). 
125 
  
 
 
 
 
   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DO NOT DELETE 10/7/201110:37 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [20xx 
politicians and bar associations setting recusal rules and judges enforcing
those rules, have paid undue attention to the substantive recusal standard 
at the expense of other rules and standards that may actually be more 
important when it comes to maximizing the appearance of impartiality. 
A. “Getting to Recusal” 
Today, the entire “appearance” inquiry takes place at one discrete
point of a recusal timeline: the time when the actual recusal decision is 
made. It is only then that the appearance-of-bias test is triggered, and 
only then that anybody—usually the very judge whose continued
presence on the case is being questioned—considers the potential effect
on public perception if the challenged judge continues to preside over, or 
casts a vote in, the case. The timing is generally not viewed as a problem
because of the widely accepted assumption that if the judge makes the 
correct recusal decision, public confidence in the judiciary will be 
restored. In other words, so long as the judge reaches a “correct” recusal 
decision, law essentially operates on the well-established playground 
basketball principle of “no harm, no foul.” Under this assumption, 
postponing consideration of appearances until this late juncture makes 
perfect sense. 
Operating under this assumption, policymakers (when it comes to 
recusal, the policymakers are usually legislators, bar associations, or state
supreme courts) have focused almost entirely on the substantive recusal 
standard, amending it when controversies arise and defining more 
precisely the circumstances that should lead to recusal.126 For example, 
at the federal level, when Congress decides to amend the judicial 
disqualification statute, it almost always “enlarge[s] the enumerated
grounds for seeking disqualification.”127 The focus on the substantive 
standard has led to what some commentators have termed a “vicious
cycle.”128 Describing the holding pattern in the development of judicial
disqualification doctrine in the United States, Amanda Frost wrote: 
First, Congress sets the standard governing when judges must remove
themselves from sitting on cases in which they are not able, or might 
not be able, to be impartial. That standard is then narrowly construed 
by the judges who must apply it to decide whether they themselves 
126. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2006) (providing that federal judges are disqualified in certain 
narrowlydrawn scenarios). 
127. FLAMM, supra note 2, § 23.1, at 670. 
128. Leubsdorf, supra note 16, at 245. 
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should be disqualified from a case. Eventually, a particularly egregious
situation arises in which a judge sits on a case when most outside 
observers think that she should have stepped aside. The situation comes 
to the attention of the press, the public, and ultimately Congress, which 
amends the law to provide stiffer standards for recusal. And then the 
whole process begins anew.129 
But it is not only politicians and bar leaders whooperate under this 
assumption. Most of the scholarship in the field has focused on what I 
call “getting to recusal”—that is, seeking solutions that will lead to the 
“correct” substantive recusal decision, assuming, once again, that if 
judges can reach such a decision, recusal will do its job. In discussing 
recusal, scholars generally pay insufficient attention to preventing the 
underlying event or conduct from occurring. 
Much of the normative recusal scholarship falls into one of two 
broad categories.130 The first focuses on the substantive recusal standard 
itself. Some authors argue that the appearance-based recusal standard is 
misguided and should be changed.131 For example, Sarah Cravens 
suggests that the main goal of judicial ethics is to achieve not the 
appearance of justicebut rather actual justice in judicial
decisionmaking.132 She argues that impartiality concerns should be 
addressed not through recusal standards that focus on appearance, but 
rather “through a requirement that judges provide explanations of 
adequate internal legal reasons supporting their dispositive decisions.”133 
Others defend the standard against these attacks, arguing that 
appearances should continue to play an importantor even greater role in 
the substantive recusal standard.134 Both camps, however, focus on the
actual recusal decision;their disagreement is only about the standard that 
should be applied. They both mirror the approach that Congress has 
129. Frost, supra note 43, at 538. 
130. There is of course a great deal of descriptive scholarship looking at the history and 
evolution of judicial recusals, describing trends in judicial disqualification jurisprudence, and
discussing the implications of particular recusal decisions. 
131. Sarah M.R. Cravens, In Pursuit of Actual Justice, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1 (2007). 
132. Id. 
133. Id. at 2. 
134. Bassett, supra note 52; Frank, supra note 25; Jed HandelsmanShugerman, In Defense of 
Appearances  What Caperton v. Massey Should Have Said, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 529 (2010); Jeffrey 
W. Stempel, Completing Caperton and Clarifying Common Sense Through Using the Right Standard 
for Constitutional Judicial Recusal, 29 REV. LITIG. 249 (2010); Brian P. Leitch, Note, Judicial
Disqualification in the Federal Courts A Proposal to Conform Statutory Provisions to Underlying 
Policies, 67 IOWA L. REV. 525 (1982). 
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taken, tinkering with the substantive recusal standardsand amending 
judicial disqualification statutes. 
The second, larger category of recusal-related scholarship involves 
attempts by academics to identify the facts and circumstances that should 
lead to disqualification under the current, appearance-based standard.135 
Here, again, the focus is on the recusal decision, but this time the effort is 
not to formulate the best substantive standard but rather to determine 
when recusal is necessary in the current scheme. For example, in a recent
article, Keith Swisher argues that judges taking a “tough on crime” 
stance in the course of judicial elections should be disqualified under the 
current appearance-based recusal standard because their impartiality may 
reasonably be questioned.136 Others have argued for additional guidance 
and inclusion of specific, clear, bright-line substantive rules that would
aid the court in deciding whether refusal to recuse would create an 
appearance of impropriety.137 
The assumption that a stringent recusal standard can negate the 
damage to appearances, and reinforce the appearance of judicial 
impartiality, also motivates judges. Concurring in White, which struck 
down a provision in Minnesota’s code of judicial ethics that prohibited
judicial election candidates from discussing political issues and 
announcing their positions on those issues, Justice Kennedy explained 
that states “may adopt recusal standards more rigorous than due process 
requires, and censure judges who violate these standards.”138 In other 
words, according to Justice Kennedy, the way to create and foster an 
appearance of a fair and impartial judiciary is by tightening the recusal 
framework, not by regulating the judicial conduct that creates the 
appearance in the first place. 
The same reasoning continued in Caperton, where Justice Kennedy, 
this time writing for the Court, said that the “appearance of impropriety” 
standard is “[t]he principal safeguard against judicial campaign abuses’ 
that threaten to imperil ‘public confidence in the fairness and integrity of 
the nation’s elected judges.”139 Again, any damage to the public
confidence in the impartiality and fairness of the courts is to be remedied 
135. See Abramson, supra note 56; Abramson, supra note42. 
136. Keith Swisher, Pro-Prosecution Judges “Tough on Crime,” Soft on Strategy, Ripe for 
Disqualification, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 317 (2010). 
137. Abramson, supra note 42, at 1080. 
138. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 794 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
139. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129 S.Ct. 2252, 2266 (2009) (emphasis added) 
(quoting Brief for Conference of Chief Justices as Amicus Curiaeat 4, 11). 
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impartiality could reasonably be questioned and recuses, or (b) that his 
impartiality could not be questioned and declines to recuse. There are
two reasons for this surprising assertion. 
1. Too little, too late 
The first reason why the “getting to recusal” approach fails to foster 
an appearance of impartiality is because the focus on appearances comes 
too late. Because appearances are considered only at the time of the final 
recusal decision, judges are free to engage in conduct that ultimately 
creates an appearance of partiality, and only then, once the appearance
has been created, is the judge expected to recuse.142 This means that by
the time the recusal decision is ultimately made and publicized, the 
public has already observed the conduct and the events that negatively
affect its perception of the judiciary and formed its own, often negative, 
opinions about judicial impartiality. Recusal is intended as the solution to 
the problem; by requiring the judge to step aside, any appearance of 
impartiality is 
thought to be eliminated and public confidence in the court restored. 
Research done by political scientists James Gibson and Gregory 
Caldeira suggests that things are not quite so simple.143 Gibson and
Caldeira set out to study recusal’s effect on restoring the public’s
confidence in the judgment of a particular case or in the judiciary itself. 
They used vignettes modeled after the facts in Capertonto determine 
whether citizens believed that “the recipient of the campaign support can 
serve as a fair and impartial judge and whether the West Virginia 
Supreme Court itself is a legitimate institution.”144 Among the 
independent variables that Gibson and Caldeira manipulated was the 
judge’s recusal decision—did the judge step aside or did the judge cast
his vote in the case despite the calls for recusal. The authors 
hypothesized, just as scholars and politicians for centuries had assumed, 
142. It is important to highlight that the underlying conduct that is the focus of this Article is 
not improper by itself, as judicial codes already prohibit judges from engaging in such conduct. 
Rather, the problem arises only when a particular litigant, or a particular case, appears in front of the
judge. 
143. James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Campaign Support, Conflicts of Interest, and
Judicial Impartiality Can the Legitimacy of Courts Be Rescued by Recusals?, (Oct. 19, 2009)(on
file with the author),available athttp://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1428723 
(follow “One-Click Download” hyperlink). 
144. Id. at 11. 
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that “where a conflict of interest exists, recusal will rescue the legitimacy
of the court.”145 
But this assumption turned out to be wrong, at least in part. Instead, 
the study revealed that the “effect of recusals is not to restore the 
court/judge to the level of support that exists when no conflict of interest 
is present.”146 That is, the recusal decision did not counteract the
appearance of partiality that was created when a judicial candidate
accepted contributions from a future litigant. This research confirms that 
the traditional assumption that recusals can neutralize conflicts of 
interests may not be entirely correct, and that “recusal is only a weak 
palliative for conflicts of interests created by contributions.”147 In other 
words, even when a judge on a multi-member court recuses, the public’s
confidence in that court is only partially restored,and the public’s 
perception of partiality and bias is not completely erased. 
These results may be surprising to some, but they also make a great 
deal of sense. Sticking to the judicialelection context, we know that 
campaign contributions have a negative effect on institutional 
legitimacy.148 This concern is not without reason, since data suggest that 
judges are more likely to decide in favor of their contributor.149 
Furthermore, the public may be reasonably concerned that other
contributions were made that simply have not yet come to light. It is 
much too optimistic, then, to expect that institutional legitimacy will be 
restored when apparentlybiased judges recuse themselves. To paraphrase
Mr. Darcy, the public’s good opinion of the judiciary, once lost, is lost 
forever (or, at the very least, is not entirely restored by judicial 
recusal).150 In short, concentrating on the actual recusal decision in order 
to create or maximize the appearance of impartiality may make up only 
part of the picture, and our focus on appearances must come before the 
decision maker makes a recusal decision. 
To see how this problem operates in the real world, let us take a look 
at what circumstances may lead to the public’s loss of confidence in the 
judiciary. The trigger may be a judge’s interest in one of the parties or in 
a certain outcome in litigation, as it was in Tumeyand Lavoie,or it may be 
145. Id. at 13. 
146. Id. at 32. 
147. Id. at 3. 
148. Id. 
149. Shepherd, supra note 111. 
150. JANE AUSTEN, PRIDE AND PREJUDICE 94 (Patricia Meyer Spacks ed., 2010) (1813) (“My
good opinion once lost is lost forever.”). 
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the judge’s relationship with a litigant or an attorney for one of the 
parties, as it was in Capertonand the Scalia-Cheney duckhunting
incident. An example of the former was recently on display in the 
challenge to the federal drilling moratorium in the wake of the BP 
disaster in the Gulf. Judge Martin Feldman, a U.S. District Court Judge 
for the Eastern District of Louisiana overturned a six-month moratorium
on drilling that halted the approval of any new permits and suspended
deep-water drilling at existing exploratory wells in the Gulf. It was later 
discovered that Judge Feldman held energy stocks in numerous drilling 
and offshore energy companies, including Transocean and Halliburton. 
After Judge Feldman failed to recuse himself, the case received
significant media attention as numerous environmental groups sought 
recusal.151 But putting aside the judge’s recusal decision,152 the relevant
question for this Article is whether a different substantive recusal 
standard—or even a different recusal decision—would have restored 
public confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary. I believe the answer 
is “no.” 
When the federal drilling moratorium was litigated, the Los Angeles 
Times reported that 
[S]even of the 12 federal judges of the Eastern District of Louisiana 
already have cited potential conflicts of interest in bowing out of cases
brought by fishermen, charter operators, tourist services and families of 
those killed in the April 20 explosion of the Deepwater Horizon rig in 
the Gulf of Mexico.153 
In the Fifth Circuit, it was discovered that most judges held some interest 
in oil companies, or had other close ties to the oil industry.154 As a result, 
recusals in cases involving the oil industry have become so common in 
the Fifth Circuit that the court was unable to reach a quorum to review a 
151. The Sierra Club, Natural Resources Defense Council, and Defenders of Wildlife were 
among the groups that sought Judge Feldman’s recusal. Tennille Tracy, Groups Seek Judge’s
Removal in Drilling-Moratorium Case, WALL ST. J.,July 2, 2010, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704293604575343361857605650.html. 
152. In other words, let us assume that a reasonable person could question Judge Feldman’s 
impartiality and that recusal was indeed required by 28 U.S.C. § 455—a reasonable assumption 
given the controversy that arose following Judge Feldman’s decision. 
153. Carol J. Williams, Judges’ Hands Tied By Oil Industry Interests, L.A. TIMES, June 23, 
2010, at A2. 
154. SeeALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, JUDICIAL GUSHER: THE FIFTH CIRCUIT’S TIES TO 
OIL,http://www.afj.org/about-afj/press/fifth_circuit_judges_report.pdf (summarizing investments
and interests of Fifth Circuit judges in the gas and oil industries) (last visited Aug. 18, 2011). 
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case brought by victims of Hurricane Katrina.155 It is precisely these
types of interests that may create the impression of a biased and partial
judiciary, and once the public has perceived judicial bias or a quid pro 
quo between a judge and a potential litigant, the recusal decision, no 
matter what the substantive standard and no matter what the decision, 
cannot fully restore the public’s confidence in the courts. 
The Gibson &Caldeira study is the first of its kind. Very little is 
known about how the recusal decision affects public perception of 
judicial impartiality. Because of the centuries-old assumption that recusal 
restores public confidence in the court, scholars have largely ignored this 
issue. My hope is that Gibson &Caldeira’s findings, together with this 
Article,will spur further study of how the public perceives judicial 
recusal decisions, and the extent to which even a correct recusal decision 
may still leave the reputation of the judiciary in doubt. 
2. One case at a time 
The second reason why focusing excessively on the substantive
appearance-based recusal standard and considering appearance only at 
the time of the recusal decision fails to foster an appearance of 
impartiality is that one-time, one-off recusal decisions are not as 
effective in maximizing public confidence in the judiciary and the 
legitimacy of the courts as broad structural reforms. In a wide range of 
fields, scholars have observed that effective reform often requires
structural changes rather than relying on favorable outcomes one case at 
a time.156 When recusal decisions are made on an ad hoc basis, public
confidence in the judiciary is undermined. This is partly because the 
public does not know what led to a particular decision, and partly 
because, as discussed in greater detail below, the public only learns of a 
limited set of recusal decisions, which skews its perception.157 This is 
true even when the challenged judge properly assesses whether her 
impartiality may reasonably be questioned, and even when the judge 
ultimately recuses herself. 
It is generally understood that “[a]s a matter of legal technique, it is 
far preferable to have sound general principles rather than ad hoc rules, 
155. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 607 F.3d 1049, 1054 (5th Cir. 2010). 
156. JAMES BESSEN& MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, 
AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 25 (2008). 
157. The public’s lack of knowledge is especially true because judges rarely publish an 
opinion explaining their recusal decision. 
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or even worse, a ‘myriad of single instances.’”158But when it comes to 
recusal, ad hoc decisions are the norm, and each recusal decision
becomes a one-time proposition, good for that day only. There is great 
variation from judge to judge in how they resolve recusal questions, and 
this variation not only leads to inconsistent results but also leads the 
public to question the fairness and impartiality of the judiciary. 
Another reason why considering appearances on a case-by-case basis 
is problematic is that, at the point of recusal, judges generally know the 
parties, the lawyers, and the nature of the particular dispute from which 
they are asked to recuse. Of course, this information is not supposed to 
matter to the judge making the recusal decision, but it is hard to know 
whether it filters into judicial recusal analysis. For example, if the case 
involves a subject-matter close to the judge’s heart—let’s say the judge 
is particularly interested in expanding the scope of the First 
Amendment—there is a risk that the judge will decide not to recuse 
because she wants to cast a vote in the case, despite the fact that she may 
have a close relationship with one of the attorneys, or despite the fact that 
one of the litigants contributed heavily to her campaign. As Part IV
argues below, the solution to this problem is that legislators must 
consider appearances ex ante, without knowing the particular
circumstances in which recusal may arise in the future. 
Congress and the courts have acknowledged the importance of 
appearances when it comes to judicial legitimacy. Now, they must come
to realize that structural problems should be remedied by large-scale 
systemic solutions, not in a case-by-case fashion.159 Recusal statutes and 
judicial codes are unable to protect judicial legitimacy and the 
appearance of impartiality as long as the appearances are considered in 
an ad hoc fashion. In the recusal context in particular, there are two 
reasons why recusal decisions in individual cases do not create an 
appearance of impartiality: (1) the role of the media in publicizing non­
recusal decisions,and (2) the difficulties inherent in the substantive 
recusal standard. 
a. Judicial recusal and the media. The media plays an ever-
increasing and important role in the way the public perceives judicial 
disqualification and judicial impartiality. When it comes to judicial 
158. HAMMOND, supra note 116, at 6. 
159. Cf. Pamela S. Karlan, Electing Judges, Judging Elections, and the Lessons of Caperton, 
123 HARV. L. REV. 80 (2009) (highlighting the difficulties inherent in the Court’s approach to 
addressing structural problems relating to judicial impartiality). 
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disqualification, only cases of non-recusal generally receive media 
scrutiny and public recognition. This is part of the reason why legislative 
and judicial reliance on judicial recusal decisions to create an appearance 
of impartiality, or even to eliminate the appearance of partiality, is 
misguided—when a judge steps aside, the public rarely knows it. 
One need only look at the controversies that have arisen in the last 
few years alone—Justice Scalia’s nonrecusal in the case involving Dick 
Cheney, Justice Benjamin’s nonrecusal in Caperton, and Judge 
Feldman’s nonrecusal in Hornbeck Offshore Services v. Salazar. 160 But 
one is hard-pressed to identify any high-profile cases of recusal. This is 
because recusal often takes place under the radar, without an explanation
or an opinion from the recusing judge, and without media scrutiny. For 
example, decisions of the Supreme Court often indicate that one or more 
Justices did not participate in the case with a simple note that reads
“Justice _______ did not participate in the decision.”161 Unlike the
criticism and scrutiny that often accompanies nonrecusal decisions, these 
judicial recusals are generally ignored by the media and therefore cannot
increase (or even affect) public perception of judicial impartiality. 
In the rare circumstances when judicial recusals (as opposed to 
nonrecusals) actually receive public scrutiny, the attention is generally 
negative, often focusing on the underlying judicial conduct that 
necessitated recusal in the first place. In other words, even when judges 
fully appreciate that their impartiality might reasonably be questioned, 
their decision to recuse, just like their decision not to recuse, often is to 
the detriment of public confidence in the judiciary. This is because it 
highlights the conduct that created the appearance of impartiality in the 
first place. I touched on one example earlier in the Article: the media 
coverage of Fifth Circuit judges, and their frequent recusal in cases 
involving the oil industry. Despite judicial recusals in those cases, the
reputation of the judiciary likely suffered from the disclosure that many, 
if not most,Fifth Circuit judges have connections to the oil and gas 
industry. 
Another prominent recent example of a recusal that received largely 
negative attention involved Ninth Circuit Chief Judge Alex Kozinski. In 
2008, Judge Kozinski was presiding over an obscenity trial when it was
reported that Kozinski’s personal website contained explicit
160. 696 F. Supp. 2d 627 (E.D. La. 2010). 
161. See, e.g.,Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 129 S. Ct. 2592 
(2009) (in which Justice Stevens did not participate because he owns beachfront property in Florida). 
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pornographic material.162 When the reports became public, Judge
Kozinski recused himself from the case. Following the recusal, the public 
commentary was overwhelmingly negative and critical of the judge, 
focusing on the underlying conduct rather than on the recusal decision
itself. Here again, a recusal decision intended to create the appearance of 
impartiality and fairness potentially had the opposite effect.163 
Aside from the fact that nonrecusal decisions receive far greater public 
scrutiny and attention than recusal decisions, there is yet another reason 
why even a correct recusal decision, one that properly considers public
perception and appearance, does not promote an appearance of 
impartiality. This is because the public’s perception of the underlying 
events is often skewed by the “lens of the media.” To apply the 
appearance-based disqualification test correctly under the federal
disqualification statute (28 U.S.C. § 455) or the state judicial codes, a 
judge must determine whether an impartial and objective 
observer,knowing all the facts, might question the judge’s impartiality
and reasonably perceive an appearance of bias. But the public rarely, if 
ever, has access to all the facts that underpin a recusal controversy. These 
facts are often complex and may involve long-standing relationships
between the judge and a litigant, or the judge and an attorney. While the 
superficial level of knowledge that the public may have perceived, or 
learned from media coverage, may lead a reasonable member of the 
public to question the judge’s impartiality, a greater understanding of the 
judiciary and the situation may negate any appearance of impropriety. 
As a result of this tension, the challenged judge may correctly 
determine that recusal is unnecessary because no reasonable person 
knowing all of the facts could question the judge’s impartiality, while at 
the same time the public perceives bias because it is basing its 
conclusions on a different set of facts.164 Once again, we may be left 
162. Obscenity Trial Suspended After Judge Posts Sex Images Online, FOX NEWS, June 12, 
2008, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,365701,00.html. 
163. Of course, this case is not typical and the salacious nature of the facts contributed to the 
negative publicity. 
164. This was the issue raised by Justice Scalia in his recusal memorandum following the 
duckhunting trip with Vice President Cheney. In seeking Scalia’s recusal, the Sierra Club argued that 
“[b]ecause the American public, as reflected in the nation’s newspaper editorials, has unanimously
concluded that there is an appearance of favoritism, any objective observer would be compelled to 
conclude that Justice Scalia’s impartiality has been questioned.” Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for the 
D.C., 541 U.S. 913, 923 (2004). Justice Scalia identified numerous factual mistakes in the
editorialsand argued that the editorials should play no role in determining whether a reasonable
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with a “correct” recusal decision that simultaneously damages the 
reputation of the judiciary and harms the appearance of impartiality. 
b. The appearances of appearances. Furthermore, in an ironic twist, 
the substantive appearance-based recusal standard itself may damage the 
reputation of the judiciary and minimize its legitimacy for two reasons. 
First, an appearance-based substantive recusal standard may be 
inconsistent with the practice of judicial elections. Jed Shugerman 
suggests that a slightly ambiguous standard like the “appearance of bias” 
has an advantage insofar as it may lead judges to “err in favor of recusing 
themselves.”165 And it is undoubtedly true that some judges do err on the 
side of caution, and step aside simply to avoid any controversy even 
when they do not believe their partiality could reasonably be questioned. 
But, thirty-nine states elect some or all of their judges, and the public 
overwhelmingly prefers elected judges over appointed ones, despite
concerns about bias towards campaign contributors.166 As Justice
O’Connor explained in her concurrence in White, judges who must run 
for reelection “are likely to feel that they have at least some personal 
stake in the outcome of every publicized case.”167 Studies show that even 
minor contributions, even rejected contributions, may create an 
appearance of partiality requiring recusal.168 An aggressive recusal 
standard may defeat the very purpose of electing judges and could
actually harm judicial legitimacy by depriving citizens of an opportunity 
to choose their judges for the cases that matter most.169 
There is another reason why the appearance-based recusal standard 
may itself be damaging to the public perception of the judiciary. The 
“appearance of bias” test is not a model of clarity and precision, with 
some commentators going so far as to call the standard unworkable at 
observer would question Scalia’s impartiality. Id. at 924 (“Such a blast of largely inaccurate and 
uninformed opinion cannot determine the recusal question.”). 
165. Shugerman, supra note 134, at 550. 
166. James Sample et al., The New Politics of Judicial Elections2006, THE BRENNAN CENTER 
FOR JUST.(2007), http://brennan.3cdn.net/49c18b6cb18960b2f9_z6m62gwji.pdf. 
167. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 536, 788–89 (2002) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added). 
168. Gibson &Caldeira, supra note 143. 
169. A recent study showed that in 60 percent of the cases heard by the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court, “at least one of the litigants, attorneys, or firms involved had contributed to the election 
campaign of at least one justice.”Campaign Contributors and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, 
AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, http://www.ajs.org/selection/jnc/docs/AJS-PAstudy3-18-10.pdf 
(last updated 2009). 
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best, and a sham at worst.170 This problem becomes more acute as high-
profile accusations of judicial bias and partiality become more and more
common, as they have in the recent months. As the dissenters in 
Caperton argued, an increase in the number of allegations that judges are 
biased will further “erode public confidence” in the fairness and integrity 
of the courts.171 While these predictions may be overblown,172 one 
cannot help but wonder whether an expansive recusal standard and 
increased publicity for recusal motions may adversely affect the public
perception of the judiciary by undermining confidence in the fairness and 
impartiality of the American judiciary. This is in part because it is so 
easy to allege an appearance of impropriety and so hard to determine 
whether there in fact is an appearance of impropriety. When recusal 
standards are too nebulous, and if allegations of an appearance of bias
become the norm in litigation, recusal law becomes too vulnerable to 
manipulation and rather than furthering the appearance of impartiality, 
may only harm it. Additional research is necessary to confirm the 
suspicion that over-recusal, and excessive demands for recusal, can 
weaken the judiciary’s reputation. But at least one commentator suggests 
that this may indeed be the case.173 
IV. EX ANTE REGULATION AND RECUSAL PROCEDURE 
This Part proposes two changes to American recusal jurisprudence 
intended to increase public confidence in the impartiality of the courts 
and maximize judicial legitimacy. First, I will argue that when 
possible,ex ante regulation of judicial conduct that prevents the 
appearance of bias from arising in the first place would be the best 
method for creating and maintaining an appearance of judicial 
impartiality and fairness. Second, I propose that appearance-based
regulation of recusal procedures may in fact do more to maximize the 
appearance of impartiality than the substantive recusal standards. 
A. Ex Ante Regulation of Judicial Conduct and Judicial Elections 
There is vast literature examining the tension between ex ante and ex 
170. SeeRotunda, supra note 117. 
171. Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2267 (2009) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting). 
172. SeeBruce A. Green, Fear of the Unknown  Judicial Ethics After Caperton, 60 SYRACUSE 
L. REV. 229, 233–34 (2010). 
173. Rotunda, supra note 117. 
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postconsideration in creating legal rules and standards. The advantage of 
an ex post approach is that it permits greater accuracy and tailoring while
ex ante considerations often allow for greater clarity. But if it is true that 
recusal comes too late to restore public confidence in the judiciary once 
an appearance of bias has been created—if ex post recusal decisions are 
not the best way to “promote public confidence in the integrity of the 
judicial process”174—then the most important recusal related 
jurisprudential changes are not actually changes to recusal rules at all. 
Rather, they are changes to other rules regulating judges—rules of 
judicial conduct and judicial selection—that explicitly consider how
certain judicial behavior may influence the perception of judicial
impartiality. For judicial regulation to truly have an effect on the 
appearance of impartiality, we must increase our regulation of the very 
conduct that createsthe appearance problem in the first place, avoiding
even the creation of an appearance of bias. In other words, when it comes
to considering the appearance of impartiality and fairness, the best time 
to think about recusal is before the appearance of bias arises. 
By pushing back the time when appearances are considered we can 
avoid much of the damage that the judiciary suffers as a result of 
improper judicial conduct while eliminating the need for recusal rules 
and decisions to carry the heavy load of remedying the problem. Under 
the proposed ex ante regime, policymakers must do whatever possible to 
minimize the need for potential future recusals, as well as the number of 
calls for recusal. Implementation of better ex ante rules can reduce the 
number of future Caperton-like appeals and ease the dissenting Justices’ 
concerns that the Caperton decision will lead to a flood of new recusal 
motions. Greater ex ante regulation of judicial conduct and judicial 
elections also helps alleviate, if not eliminate, the “one case at a time” 
problem identified in Part III.B.2. While judges may not be in the best 
position to engage in the line drawing required in individual recusal 
cases,ex ante regulation allows the line drawing to be done on a general, 
systemic level by legislators or bar associations. In other words, adopting
an ex ante approach to judicial recusal “eliminates the 
burden on judges to determine where the line for recusal is drawn.”175 
Furthermore,ex ante regulation of judicial conduct is preferable to ex 
174. Liljeberg v. Health Serv. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 860 (1988) (citing S. Rep. No. 
93-419, at 5 (1973); H.R. Rep. No. 93-1453, at 5 (1974)). 
175. Symposium, Session 1 One Symptom of a Serious Problem Caperton v. Massey, 33 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 569, 587 (2010) (transcript of comments of Kathleen Sullivan). 
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post recusal-based regulation because the latter method misses the 
conduct that negatively affects the judiciary but that may never otherwise 
come to light. For example, in an election context, the losing candidate’s
conduct may harm the reputation of the judiciary but would never be 
challenged on recusal. Likewise, recusal is not welldesigned to address a 
situation where a judge develops a relationship with a particular 
contributor, and while that particular contributor never appears as a 
litigant in front of the judge, making recusal unnecessary, the contributor 
may still have an interest in the outcome of other cases heard by the 
judge. This “different litigant, same interest” problem is extremely
difficult to address with recusal but may still damage the appearance of 
judicial impartiality and harm the reputation of the judiciary. 
I propose four categories where ex ante rules couldassist in avoiding
damage to judicial legitimacy and the appearance of partiality. Within
each category, I will discuss my proposed rule and provide an example
of how the rule would operate in the context of recent recusal-related 
controversies: (1) judicial elections, (2) judicial friendships and 
relationships, (3) judicial financial interests, and (4) extrajudicial 
activities. 
1. Judicial elections 
a. The problem. We start at the beginning of the judge’s career: 
judicial selection.176 The process by which a judge is selected is one of 
the key factors in the public’s perception of the courts.177especially
important are the methods of judicial selection and the campaign
environment.178 In fact, the element of judicial elections that has the
greatest effect on the public’s perception of the judiciary is campaign
fundraising.179 As mentioned earlier, the public’s concerns about the
impartiality of judges receiving contributions from litigants are 
wellfounded. Recent studies confirm that judges are more likely to rule
176. Of course, recusal may be necessary as a result of a judge’s conduct before judicial
selection. For example, if a judge worked as a partner at a law firm before joining the bench, as 
many judges have, those friendships cannot be regulated by an ex ante scheme. Ex postrecusal rules, 
like those contained in 28 U.S.C. § 455(b) are intended to address these situations. 
177. Cann& Yates, supra note 15, at 316. 
178. Penny J. White, Using Judicial Performance Evaluations to Supplement Inappropriate 
Voter Cues and Enhance Judicial Legitimacy, 74 MO. L. REV. 635, 645 (2009). 
179. James L. Gibson, Challenges to the Impartiality of State Supreme Courts Legitimacy
Theory and “New-Style” Judicial Campaigns, 102 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 59, 69 (2008). 
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for those who helped fund their campaigns.180 Because ex post recusal 
cannot fully restore judicial legitimacy, it is important that we regulate
conduct during judicial elections in order to avoid the harm in the first 
place. In other words, legislatures must regulate judicial elections to 
ensure that election-related practices and conduct do not damage the 
appearance of impartiality by pushing back the timeframe for when we
look at appearance—all the way back to the election itself. 
In Caperton, recusal was necessary because one of the litigants spent 
extravagant amounts of money to elect the very judge who would later 
rule on that litigant’s case.181 The damage to the reputation of the
judiciary is done at this early stage. The very fact that a future or current 
litigant helps a judge get elected gives rise to the appearance of judicial
bias and partiality. 
And Caperton does not present a unique fact pattern. Most judges in 
the United States stand for election and must raise the funds for their 
candidacies from the parties that they may eventually meet in the 
courtroom. For example,Avery v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance 
Company182 was a class action suit for breach of contract in which the
plaintiffs alleged that State Farm violated its duty to restore automobiles 
to their original pre-crash condition by using automobile parts salvaged 
from other damaged vehicles.183 After the lower courts found in favor of 
the plaintiffs, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed. Like Caperton,Avery 
was decided shortly after an election cycle for the Illinois Supreme 
Court. During his campaign for the court, Justice Lloyd Karmeier made
numerous pro-business statements.184Karmeier also received over 
$350,000 in contributions from State Farm’s employees and its 
lawyers.185 After
being elected to the bench, Justice Karmeier declined to recuse himself 
180. Michael S. Kang & Joanna Shepherd, The Partisan Price of Justice An Empirical
Analysis of Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decisions, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 69, 69 (2011) 
(“[E]very dollar of direct contributions from business groups is associated with an increase in the 
probability that the judges will vote for business litigants.”). 
181. Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2257. In sum, the litigant spent 
about three million dollars. 
182. 835 N.E.2d 801 (Ill. 2005). 
183. Id. at 811. 
184. See Goldberget al., supra note 106, at 510. 
185. Brief for 12 Organizations Concerned About the Influence of Money on Judicial 
Integrity, Impartiality, and Independence as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 4, Avery v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 547 U.S. 1003 (2006) (No. 05-842). 
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andcast the deciding vote in favor of the defendant. 
These two cases are just a small part of a larger problem. In fact, 
elected judges deciding cases involving their contributors has reached
epidemic proportions. For example, a recent study showed that nearly 
two-thirds of cases heard by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 2008 
and 2009 involved at least one party, lawyer, or law firm that contributed 
to the campaign of at least one of the justices.186 
In one word, the problem here is “money.”187 In response to 
Caperton, some states have begun to put in place ex post recusal 
reforms.188 But to really get at appearances of judicial partiality, states 
should create ex ante rules focusing on their election practices. 
b. The solution. What specific rules must be reformed? Most of 
the damage described above comes from judicial contributions and 
independent expenditures by individuals or groups that are likely to come 
in front of the elected judge as litigants. Therefore, legislators must better 
regulate the flow of money from contributors to judicial candidates by
(1) eliminating or limiting direct contributions and independent 
expenditures for judicial elections altogether, (2) implementing a public 
financing scheme for judicial elections, or (3)
requiring that all contributions to judicial candidates be anonymous.189 
186. Malia Reddick & James R. DeBuse, Campaign Contributions and the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court, THE BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUST.(Mar. 11, 2010),
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/elert/campaign_contributions_and_the_pennsylvania_suprem 
e_court/. 
187. Bert Brandenburg, Big Money and Impartial Justice Can They Live Together? 52 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 207, 217 (2010) (“Money is changing judicial elections and threatens to erode trust in the 
courts themselves.”). 
188. See, e.g., New York’s new rule prohibiting elected judges from deciding cases involving
litigants that had contributed $2,500 or more to their campaigns. SeeRules Governing the 
Assignment of Cases Involving Contributors to Judicial Campaigns, RULES OF THE CHIEF 
ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE OF THE COURTS § 151.1, available at 
http://nycourts.gov/rules/chiefadmin/151.shtml#section151_1. 
189. This Article does not discuss the potential constitutional hurdles to regulating judicial 
campaign contributions. While these hurdles are real, their effect may be overstated. After the 
Supreme Court’s decision in White, commentators predicted that most regulation of judicial
campaigns may be unconstitutional under the First Amendment. Lower-level courts struck down a 
number of canons regulating candidates’ conduct in judicial elections. After Caperton, things may 
be looking up for supporters of regulation of judicial elections. See James Sample, Caperton Correct 
Today, Compelling Tomorrow, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 293, 303–04 (2010) (concluding that 
Caperton“provides real momentum for state-based recusal reform efforts”). In fact, Caperton’s 
apparent disregard of the infamous contribution/expenditure framework from Buckley v. Valeo 
suggests that states may regulate spending in judicial elections in ways that are otherwise 
impermissible in other elections. 
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Requiring anonymous contributions is a particularly appealing 
proposal becausesuch a requirement likely would not be subject to many
of the constitutional objections that a proposal to eliminate or limit 
contributions altogether would be.190 It is difficult to understand why
judges need to know the identity of their contributors, and why
contributors must let judges know that they have contributed, other than 
to curry favor with the judges.191 A few states experimented with
anonymous contributions for judicial elections in the 1970s, but the idea 
has not caught on.192 Today, this proposal may sound strange given the 
trend towards more disclosure, not less. But it is time for all states that 
elect judges to consider implementing this approach to combat the 
problem of judicial bias towards their contributors. 
Implementation of this proposal need not be overly complicated. 
Obviously, if judges were able to discover the identity of their 
contributors after the election, then the anonymity requirement would be 
futile. But it still seems likely that a successful anonymity scheme could 
be implemented. Perhaps the best approach was suggested by Ian Ayres 
and Jeremy Bulow, who proposed a similar regime that would operate 
through a privatized system of blind trusts.193 Under this 
regimecampaigns could no longer accept contributions directly from 
individuals or companies. Rather, all 
donations to candidates (and political parties) would have to bemade by 
mail to established blind trusts.194 
190. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). In the years since Buckley, there has been 
a tremendous amount of legal scholarship examining the question of whether money is speech. See,
e.g., Deborah Hellman, Money Talks But It Isn’t Speech, 95 MINN. L. REV. 953 (2011); Kathleen M. 
Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 663, 688–89 (1997); J. 
Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution  Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001 (1976). 
191. For an excellent discussion of potential ethical issues involved in attorney contributions 
to judges, see Keith Swisher, Legal Ethics and Campaign Contributions The Professional 
Responsibility to Pay for Justice, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 225 (2011). 
192. See Stuart Banner, Note, Disqualifying Elected Judges from Cases Involving Campaign
Contributors, 40 STAN. L. REV. 449, 473 n.130 (1988) (noting that the ten adopting states were 
Arkansas, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Washington, 
West Virginia, and Wyoming). 
193. Ian Ayres & Jeremy Bulow, The Donation Booth Mandating Donor Anonymity to 
Disrupt the Market for Political Influence, 50 STAN. L. REV. 837, 853 (1998). 
194. Id. 
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2. Judicial relationships 
a. The problem. The second category that is a frequent source of 
recusal controversies is judicial relationships with friends. This can 
involve close friendships as well as romantic relationships with attorneys
and litigants. Of course, these friendships are often unavoidable and 
cannot be prohibited outright. But particularly troublesome interactions 
between judges and their friends and colleagues should be regulated. 
One of the most famous recent incidents was Justice Scalia’s
infamous duck-hunting trip with then-litigant Dick Cheney. After details
of the trip came to light, calls for recusal reform grew to a fever pitch. 
The American Bar Association’s Joint Commission to Evaluate the
Model Code of Judicial Conduct considered revisions to the judicial 
code, and two Democrats on the House Judiciary Committee called for 
hearings to amend federal recusal law. Then, as always, the focus was on 
the final recusal decision; namely, Justice Scalia’s decision that his
impartiality could not reasonably be questioned. But, can we foster an 
appearance of impartiality when it comes to judicial friends through ex 
ante recusal reform? 
b. The solution. There is little scholarship on regulation of judicial 
friendships,195 and even fewer rules regulating judges’ relationships with
their friends and colleagues. What little scholarship exists supports the ex 
post“getting to recusal” approach that focuses on the substantive recusal 
rules (which I identified earlier).196 But, if our main goal is to maximize
the appearance of judicial impartiality, then it is important to amend rules 
concerning friendships or interaction between judges and litigants rather 
than focusing on recusal alone. In other words, the ex ante rules that I 
propose do more to regulate the interaction between judges and litigants 
(or likely future 
litigants) where interaction would create an appearance of partiality, even 
if the judge might eventually have an opportunity to recuse. 
For example, the rules of judicial conduct could be revised to 
prohibit any interaction between judges and current litigants, or litigants 
that are likely to appear in front of the judge within the next year.
195. But see Jeremy M. Miller, Judicial Recusal and Disqualification The Need for a Per Se 
Rule on Friendship (Not Acquaintance), 33 PEPP. L. REV. 575, 584–614 (2006) (proposing a bright-
line recusal rule for cases involving a judge’s close friends). 
196. Id. 
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Admittedly, it is often difficult to predict which litigants will appear in 
front of the judge. Furthermore, it is important that judges remain active 
members of the community and participate in bar functions like Inns of 
Court. At the very least, however, when a party is litigating a case in the 
district court, the appellate judges likely to review any future appeal
should refrain from interacting with that party until the case has 
concluded. This prophylactic measure is more likely to increase the 
appearance of impartiality and judicial legitimacy than asking the judge 
to recuse himself based on the appearance of impropriety. 
States should also consider implementing ex ante rules regulating
certain types of friendships and relationships that should be prohibited
outright. For example, judges should be prohibited from having romantic 
or sexual relationships with litigants that frequently appear in front of 
them.197 Just last year, a controversy broke out in Texas when a former 
judge and a former district attorney in Texas admitted that they had 
engaged in a lengthy affair.Both had participated in the trial of a man 
who was convicted of murder and sentenced to death.198 Similarly, a 
number of states have recently considered whether judges can be friends 
with lawyers on social networking sites like LinkedIn or Facebook.199 
While these regulations may seem simplistic, invasive, or perhaps 
downright silly, these are precisely the types of ex anteregulations that 
can prevent situations like Justice Scalia’s duck-hunting controversy 
from damaging the reputation of the judiciary. 
I do not propose that judges live in isolation, shielding themselves 
from any interaction with potential lawyers and litigants who may appear 
before them. Judicial selection mechanisms in the United States, 
whereby judges get to their position because of contacts and friendships 
formed in school, private practice, and public service, do not permit such 
an approach.200 But when one litigant shares a close friendship or an 
intimate relationship with the judge, the appearance of impartiality 
suffers. Restricting these relationships whilecases are pending is a 
197. Of course, this prohibition would not apply to judges who are married or related to those
parties, but current recusal rules already require automated disqualification in those cases. 
198. See Steve Mills, Judge’s Affair Complicates Death Row Case, CHI. TRIB.,Sept. 10, 2008,
available at http://articles.latimes.com/2008/sep/10/nation/na-execution10. 
199. John Schwartz, For Judges on Facebook, Friendship Has Limits, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 
2009, at A25. 
200. A federal judge famously quipped that a “U.S. District judge is someone who went to 
school with a future U.S. senator, and a U.S. Circuit judge is someone whose college roommate 
became a U.S. senator.” Joseph E. Lambert, Contestable Judicial Elections Maintaining
Respectability in the Post-White Era, 94 KY. L.J. 1, 3 (2005). 
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reasonable burden. 
3. Judicial financial interests 
a. The problem. American recusal law takes a hard-line approach to 
recusal when it comes to judges’ financial interests: a judge must recuse
himself from a case if he has any financial interest in a litigant, even if 
the ownership interest is only a single share of stock.201 But again, this is
an ex post rule; there is no ex ante prohibition on stock ownership in the
first place. 
We saw an example of the problems with the ex post approach last 
summer when the Fifth Circuit failed to reach a quorum in a case 
because too many judges were required to recuse themselves.202 Under 
the “getting to recusal” approach, the fact the judges recused themselves 
should eliminate any appearance of partiality. But this situation 
demonstrates why the ex post solutions alone are imperfect and 
insufficient. 
b. The solution. If damage to the judiciary’s reputation cannot be 
remedied by recusal alone, then it is important to create ex ante rules 
about stock ownership or financial interest when parties (or those 
interests) are likely to come in front of the court. Rather than permitting 
stock ownership for any company or industry that the judge wants and 
then requiring recusal or divestment on the back end, judges should
simply be prohibited from owning certain stock. It is not unreasonable to 
require that judges invest only in mutual fundsto ensure that their money 
is not closely tied to any particular company or industry. 
For example, an ex ante rule prohibiting judges in the Fifth Circuit 
from owning any direct interests in the oil industry would not unduly 
burden judges and would obviate the need for frequent recusals in cases 
that often come before the court. Thiswould do much more for the 
appearance of fairness and the reputation of the judiciary than perpetual
recusals. 
201. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4) (2006). Generally, a computer program tracks judges’ stock 
ownership, and judges are automatically excluded from hearing cases involving corporations 
featured in judges’ investment portfolios. For a criticism of the rule, see Alex Kozinski, The Real 
Issues of Judicial Ethics, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1095, 1105 (2004) (“The idea that I would give up 
my honest judgment in a case for a few dollars is beyond silly—it’s ludicrous and insulting. So many 
of the things contained within the Canons, the ones most talked about, are wholly irrelevant in 
practice. They make no difference at all.”). 
202. See Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 607 F.3d 1049, 1053–54 (5th Cir. 2010). 
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4. Extrajudicial involvement 
a. The problem. Another problem is participation by judges in 
partisan activities that may create an impression that judges decide cases 
with an eye towards those partisan interests. Canon 4 of the Code of 
Conduct for United States Judges does not appear to prohibit this type of 
conduct.203 A recent example demonstrates thisconcern. 
Shortly after the Supreme Court decided Citizens United, 204 reports
surfaced that Justices Scalia and Thomas attended seminars and a 
political retreat sponsored by the energy giant and conservative 
bankroller Koch Industries. According to a Koch Industries mailing, the 
purpose of these retreats is to raise funds “to review strategies for 
combating the multitude of public policies that threaten to destroy 
America as we know it.”205 The seminar was held shortly before the case
was added to the Supreme Court docket, but suggestions arose 
immediately that Scalia and Thomas’s ruling in Citizens United may
have been affected by their time with Koch officials.206 Nothing is 
known about the discussions that took place at the seminar, but, as noted 
by Common Cause, the primary group that argued that Scalia and 
Thomas should have recused themselves, the ruling furthered the 
interests of Koch Industries.207 
b. The solution. Because there are no clear rules in place to prevent 
203. Canon 4 of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges reads: 
A judge may engage in extrajudicial activities, including law-related pursuits and civic,
charitable, educational, religious, social, financial, fiduciary, and governmental activities, 
and may speak, write, lecture, and teach on both law-related and nonlegal subjects. 
However, a judge should not participate in extrajudicial activities that detract from the
dignity of the judge’s office, interfere with the performance of the judge’s official duties, 
reflect adversely on the judge’s impartiality, lead to frequent disqualification, or violate
the limitations set forth below. 
CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGEScanon 4 (2009). Although the second clause prohibits the judge 
from engaging in some extrajudicial activities if they “reflect adversely on the judge’s impartiality” 
or “lead to frequent disqualification,” this rule is rarely enforced, and judges generally decide for 
themselves whether their conduct runs afoul of the prohibition. Often, the judge’s impartiality cannot
be questioned until a particular case arises. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, the Code of Conduct 
does not apply to Justices of the United States Supreme Court. See supra note 54. 
204. Citizens United v. Fed.Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
205. Kate Zernike, Secretive Republican Donors Are Planning Ahead, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 
2010, at A18. 
206. See Eric Lichtblau, Advocacy Group Says Justices May Have Conflict in Campaign 
Finance Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2011, at A15. 
207. Id. 
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judges from being associated, even closely associated, with people, 
politicians, or political activists,ex post recusal is generally considered
the best, perhaps the only, solution to this kind of judicial conduct. This 
type of conduct can and should be regulated ex ante, before the 
reputation of the court suffers and judicial impartiality is questioned.208 
Just as with the regulation of judicial relationships and judicial 
financial holdings, judges should not be permitted to attend functions, 
retreats, or any other activities sponsored by groups with a direct stake
either in pending litigation or in litigation that frequently arises in front 
of the court. Such flat bans may seem draconian, but, to the extent that 
they increase the appearance of judicial impartiality and independence, 
they are worth the effort. 
B. Recusal Procedures 
Regulation of the underlying judicial conduct and implementation of 
ex ante rules that prevent the appearance of impartiality or bias from 
arising in the first place is the best approach to maximize judicial 
legitimacy and public confidence in the courts. But sometimes it is 
impossible to prevent recusals altogether no matter how well-tailored our 
ex ante rules may be. For example, no amount of ex ante regulation can 
prevent recusal-related controversies when judges were personally
involved in passing or defending the very law in question.209 
Furthermore, at least in the United States, judges become judges because 
of their relationships, friendships, and connections with influential
political leaders and members of the community established over many 
years. Those connections and relationships cannot be prevented. Neither 
can judges erase years, sometimes decades, of other experience, 
including private practice and public service. It is precisely in these 
circumstances that recusal law must be at its strongest. 
An example of a situation where ex ante solutions are theoretically
208. It should be noted that, to the extent the conduct itself creates an appearance of 
impropriety or impartiality, such conduct is already prohibited by the Code of Conduct, at least for 
all judges other than members of the United States Supreme Court. See Neumann, supra note 57. 
The ex ante proposals in this Part, and throughout this paper, are intended to regulate conduct that
does not create an appearance of impartiality until a particular case arises requiring recusal. 
209. During Elena Kagan’s confirmation hearings, for example, Justice Kagan was questioned 
about whether or not she would recuse herself from a likely Supreme Court challenge to the 
recentlyenacted health-care reform law. See Laura Meckler, Republicans Push Kagan on Health-
Care Recusal, WALL ST. J., July 15, 
2010,http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704518904575364930042286638.html. 
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possible but practically infeasible occurs when it is not the judge’s 
previous conduct that leads to damage to the appearance of impartiality, 
but that of the judge’s spouse. Two recent recusal controversies illustrate
this problem. 
First, Ninth Circuit judge Stephen Reinhardt was asked to recuse 
himself from hearing the appeal of a same-sex marriage case210 because 
his wife, Ramona Ripston, the executive director of the ACLU of 
Southern California, was consulted about whether the case should have 
been brought in the first place.211 Appellants argued that Reinhardt must 
recuse himself because his “impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned.”212 Judge Reinhardt denied the motion.213 Second, 
controversy has erupted over the activities of Virginia Thomas, the wife 
of Justice Clarence Thomas. After allegations that Mrs. Thomas has 
reported ties to anti-health care initiatives, House Democrats called for 
Justice Thomas to recuse himself from any legal challenge to the 
Affordable Care Act.214 Legal challenges to the Act have not yet reached 
the Supreme Court,215 and it is not yet known whether Justice Thomas
will indeed recuse himself from hearing the case. 
One could imagine an ex ante proposal that prohibits spouses or 
family members from engaging in political or legal activity on issues 
likely to reach the judge. And one could certainly argue that the public
can doubt the impartiality of a judge whose spouse has publicly 
participated either in the case itself, or in political activity surrounding
the case. But such ex ante solutions are too draconian and overinclusive.
Therefore, I limit my proposal to ex ante regulation of judicial conduct
and judicial elections; familial speech or behavior should be excluded 
210. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
211. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 630 F.3d 909, 911, 913 (9th Cir. 2011). 
212. Id. at 916. 
213. Id. at 911. 
214. Letter from Anthony D. Weiner, Frank Pallone, Jr., Fortey Pete Stark,& Christopher S. 
Murphy, U.S. Cong., to Justice Clarence Thomas, Supreme Court (Feb. 9, 2011), available at 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/48573148/Letter-to-Justice-Thomas-Asking-for-Recusal-In-Health-Law-
Case. The letter was also partly spurred by Justice Thomas’s failure to disclose his wife’s receipt of 
substantial sums of money from the Heritage Foundation, a prominent opponent of health-care
reform.Id. 
215. District courts have split on the constitutionality of the Act. Compare Florida ex 
rel.Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT, 2011 WL 285683 
(N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011) (finding the Act unconstitutional), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. 
Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235(11th Cir. 2011), 
with Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (upholding the Act 
as constitutional).The split is likely to reach the Court within the next couple of years. 
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from regulation. 
1. (Non)history of recusal procedure 
An astute reader may have noticed something lacking in the 
historical discussion in Part II: there was no mention of recusal 
procedure either at the state or the federal levels. This absence is not an 
omission by the author; rather, it is a reflection of the apathy and neglect 
that disqualification procedures have received from legislatures and bar 
associations devising disqualification rules as well as the courts 
interpreting them. The federal disqualification statute216does not even 
provide a procedure for its enforcement. The same is true of the Model 
Judicial Code, which, like the federal statute, sets a substantive standard 
without a procedure for how that standard is to be enforced. Judges have 
generally made up the procedures ad hoc. One cannot review the history 
of procedural recusal law because none exists. 
This observation may be surprising given the great deal of public
attention that recusal has received in the last few years as well as the 
number of amendments to the substantive recusal rules. Despite that
attention, and despite those amendments, the recusal procedures have 
remained stagnant and are by far the least developed aspect of American 
recusal jurisprudence. Scholars have observed that “[u]nlike almost any 
other area of the law, the process by which judges decide whether to 
recuse themselves ignores the systems usually employed to resolve 
disputes in a fair and impartial manner.”217 
Procedurally, policymakers treat recusal the same way it was treated
hundreds of years ago. The practice of self-recusal, a procedural quirk 
that allows the challenged judge to rule on her own recusal motion, has a 
long history in the common law. But this practice was created with 
virtually no discussion in British cases or scholarly literature before
spreading, again with no critical analysis or discussion, to Australasia 
and the Americas. This common law recusal procedure survives to this 
day: the general practice in both state and federal courts is that the judge 
to whom the motion to recuse is directed decides whether his or her 
recusal is necessary.218 And self-recusal is only one of the procedures 
that hearken back to Blackstone’s England. Judges rarely write opinions 
explaining their recusal decisions, and appellate courts rarely review 
216. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2006). 
217. Frost, supra note 43, at 536. 
218. FLEMING JAMES JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 394 (5th ed. 2001). 
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those decisions with any vigor.219 
Procedures like self-recusal may have made sense when scholars and 
lawyers simply assumed that judges sworn to uphold justice could not 
and would not be biased.220 But as our understanding of human nature 
and the judiciary repudiated that presumption, and as social scientists 
uncovered the depths of potential subconscious bias, legislators and the 
courts should have reexamined recusal procedures like self-recusal.221 A 
system that relies on a sua sponte admission of bias, or even an 
appearance of bias, by a judge is bound to fail. Instead, various courts 
throughout the nation have adopted different approaches, resulting in a 
lack of uniformity.222 Some states permit a judge whose recusal is sought 
to decide his own recusal motions, while others require somebody else to 
decide such motions.223 
More troubling is the fact that most states are silent on the subject, 
suggesting that recusal procedure is no more than an afterthought if it is a 
thought at all.224 And even when states get around to considering recusal 
procedure, the movements generally have little success. In the last 
decade, four states sought to amend their recusal rules to require that a 
judge other than the judge whose recusal is sought rule on each 
motion.225 All four efforts failed.226 
Why is recusal procedure almost entirely ignored by Congress and 
state legislatures? One explanation may be that process is viewed as 
minutiae, unworthy of legislative attention. After all, procedural law has 
been described by some as “painstaking, ministerial, and ultimately 
219. Richard E. Flamm, History of and Problems with the Federal Judicial Disqualification 
Framework, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 751, 760 (2010) (“[W]hile federal judges do recuse themselves in 
many situations, a judge who does so rarely writes an opinion explaining why.”). Because few
opinions explaining the judge’s recusal rationale are published, the law of recusal is slow to develop
and fails to provide any meaningful guidance to litigants and lawyers about when and whether 
disqualification is warranted in any particular case. 
220. SeeBLACKSTONE, supra note 26, at *361 (“[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of 
bias or favor in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority
greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.”). 
221. SeeBam,supranote 115, at 78–80 (discussing the importance of tailoring recusal
procedures to the evolving substantive standards). 
222. Leubsdorf, supra note 16, at 238. 
223. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 170.3(c)(5) (West 2006). 
224. See William E. Raftery, “The Legislature Must Save the Court from Itself”? Recusal, 
Separation of Powers, and the Post-Caperton World, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 765, 766–67 (2010) (listing
the states that do not set forth any recusal procedure for consideration of recusal motions). 
225. Id. at 772–73. 
226. Id. 
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boring.”227 Additionally, Congress has generally been cautious in 
regulating judicial procedures in order to protect judicial impartiality and 
maintain separation of powers.228 Moreover, it is (wrongly) assumed that
procedural issues should be left to judges, since that is what judges 
presumably do best. Surely, one may think, judges can create recusal 
procedures that fairly implement the substantive rules that are in place. 
Part of the explanation for this belief lies in the underlying assumption, 
discussed and challenged in Part III, that so long as the judge ultimately 
reaches the correct recusal decision, nothing else, including the 
procedure used to reach the decision, particularly matters. 
And even when scholars consider recusal procedure, it is only as a 
means to an end—the end being, once again, the correct recusal decision. 
In other words, when recusal procedure receives any attention, it is 
generally part of the critique of the outcomes rather than the appearances 
created by the procedures themselves. For example, other scholars have 
attacked the practice of self-recusal on the grounds that judges may not 
appreciate the presence of subconscious bias, which leads them to under­
recuse.229 To the contrary, I argue that procedures themselves are the
ends—it is in setting recusal procedures that we should be thinking about 
appearances, not hoping that procedures will lead to a substantive result 
that will create an appearance of impartiality. 
227. Joachim Zekoll, Comparative Civil Procedure, inTHE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW 1327–28 (Mathias Reimann&Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006). 
228. Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction, Merits, and Procedure  Thoughts on a Trichotomy, 
102 NW. U. L. REV. 1547, 1555 (2008) (“The procedure/merits line also rides on strong separation of 
powers concerns, dividing the respective lawmaking capacities of Congress and the courts.”). 
Scholars have criticized the shortcomings in a system of judicial self-discipline in other contexts. 
See, e.g., Lara A. Bazelon, Putting the Mice in Charge of the Cheese Why Federal Judges Cannot 
Always Be Trusted to Police Themselves and What Congress Can Do About It, 97 KY. L.J. 439 
(2009). 
229. See, e.g., Bassett, supra note 54, at 1242; Steven Lubet, It Takes a Court,60 SYRACUSE L. 
REV. 221, 228 (2010) (“When it comes to disqualification, it takes more than a single judge to render 
a fair decision.”). Of course, judges are at times self-aware of the possibility of subconscious bias. 
One of the all-time famous Supreme Court recusals happened in Public Utilities Commission of 
District of Columbia v. Pollak when Justice Frankfurter recused himself because of his objection to 
the playing of radios on public buses. 343 U.S. 451, 454 (1952) (“[N]either the operation of the 
service [of playing the radio on public buses] nor the action of the Commission [in] permitting its 
operation is precluded by the Constitution.”). In his memorandum explaining the recusal decision,
Frankfurter said that his subconscious hatred of the radio on public buses was so strong that his 
“unconscious feelings” could influence his resolution of the dispute. Id. at 466–67. 
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2. The importance of procedure 
Why might an appearance-based recusal procedure be more effective 
in creating an appearance of an impartial judiciary than the current 
outcome-based recusal model? Research by social scientists holds the 
key.230 This research supports the notion that the public’s perception of 
the judiciary is influenced in large part by whether the judicial process is 
perceived to be procedurally fair.231 In fact, several scholars have shown 
that even when a court’s substantive decisions are disfavored, courts 
retain their perceived legitimacy so long as the decisions were reached in 
a procedurally fair manner.232 These findings are especially true for an 
institution where the decision makers are appointed rather than elected 
and are independent from the public rather than accountable to their 
constituents.233 
Because procedural fairness is indeed crucial to public perception, 
ignoring recusal procedures is a fatal mistake, at least so long as recusal 
aims to create an appearance of impartiality. And if outcomes matter less 
than process, then leaving aside all consideration of appearances until the 
judge makes the final recusal decision, rather than establishing a proper 
appearance-based recusal procedure, misses the boat entirely. 
Taking appearances seriously, therefore, means that reforming the 
recusal procedures should be a top priority. Only such large-scale 
structural changes can create an appearance of fairness and impartiality. 
Implementing proper procedures can legitimize judicial institutions that 
often operate in an independence-based model. For example, procedural
changes requiring judges to explain their recusal decisions would foster 
judicial accountability by giving the public greater access to—and
230. James L. Gibson, Understandings of Justice Institutional Legitimacy, Procedural 
Justice, and Political Tolerance, 23 LAW &SOC’Y REV. 469, 471 (1989); Tom R. Tyler & Kenneth 
Rasinski, Procedural Justice, Institutional Legitimacy, and the Acceptance of Unpopular U.S. 
Supreme Court Decisions A Reply to Gibson, 25 LAW &SOC’Y REV. 621, 621–22 (1991). Much of 
the literature in this field focuses on the United States Supreme Court but likely applies equally to 
other institutions, including lower-level federal courts and state courts. 
231. E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 
1–2 (1988). 
232. Gibson, supra note 230, at 471; Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the 
Empowerment of Discretionary Legal Authority The United States Supreme Court and Abortion
Rights, 43 DUKE L.J. 703, 734 (1994). 
233. John R. Allison, Ideology, Prejudgment, and Process Values, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 657, 
682 (1994); Christopher J. Peters, Adjudication as Representation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 312, 314–315 
(1997). 
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understanding of—judicial recusal decisions.234 It would also require 
judges to be more thoughtful in decisions they have to justify publicly.
Americans have great faith in the courts in large part because they 
believe they get a fair shot and a fair resolution. In the context of recusals 
this means that we should create procedures that reduce the appearance 
of partiality and reassure Americans that recusal decisions are made in a 
way that fosters impartiality and independence. 
The question of what specific procedures are necessary to create the 
appearance of impartiality is difficult to answer without empirical 
studies. However, political scientists have identified four essential 
elements contributing to the perception of procedural fairness.235 First, 
litigants must be treated with dignity and respect.236 Second, parties must 
have the opportunity to participate in the process.237Third, judges must 
be trustworthy, and, fourth, the judiciary must be neutral.238 These
recommendations mirror, in some respects, those of the widely respected
Legal Process Theory developed by Hart and Sacks.239 They identified 
five central procedural elements: (1) litigants must initiate disputes, (2)
an adversarial process must allow each party to advance its position, (3) 
the court must provide a rationale for its decision, (4) the decision itself
must be supported by a body of law, and (5) the decision maker must be 
impartial.240 
Some have argued that all of the elements identified by Hart and 
Sacks should be imported to the American recusal framework in toto.241 
For example, Amanda Frost suggests that because these tenets of 
adjudication “serv[e] a vital legitimating function,” they should all be 
“incorporate[d] into recusal law.”242 There is some merit to this 
proposal; after all, if those are all essential ingredients in a legal system, 
why not incorporate them into our recusal jurisprudence? 
234. Cf. Roberts, supra note 54, at 121 (discussing how the lack of clear recusal procedures in 
the United States Supreme Court “permits unaccountability, and increases doubts about appearances
of impartiality”). 
235. Tom R. Tyler, What Do They Expect? New Findings Confirm the Precepts of 
Procedural Fairness, CAL. CTS. REV., Winter 2006, at 22–23. 
236. Id. 
237. Id. 
238. Id. 
239. HENRY M. HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE 
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (2001). 
240. Id. 
241. Frost, supra note 43, at 555–56. 
242. Id. at 535. 
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But while the five Legal Process tenets identified above are essential 
forlegitimizing judicial decisions, they may not all be necessary (or even 
advantageous) in creating an appearance of impartiality, and some may 
even undermine that goal. For example, the adversarial process is a key 
part of the American legal system, allowing both parties an opportunity 
to present their conflicting arguments. This party control over case
presentation serves a legitimizing function. But importing the adversarial 
model into recusal jurisprudence may in fact harm the appearance of 
judicial impartiality by requiring that judges (or their representatives) 
argue their cases and attempt to prove to some neutral arbiter that they 
are not biased and that their earlier conduct was not improper. Pitting
judges against litigants may in fact work to the detriment of 
243appearances. 
Therefore, this Article suggests a modified, appearance-based 
process theory, whereby those procedures that would appear to a 
reasonable person as necessary to create a fair recusal scheme would be 
implemented. In other words, rather than asking what procedures foster 
confidence in the correctness of the final decision, we should ask what 
procedures create an appearance of impartiality. This would require 
empirical studies designed to learn which aspects of the Legal Process 
Theory matter most for the purpose of appearances. For example, it 
seems that Legal Process Theory elements three, four, and five, which
require that an impartial decisionmaker provide a rationale for its 
decision in a written opinion that must be supported by a body of law, 
would likely be the crucial elements that must be imported into recusal 
procedures. Elements one and two,that litigants must initiate disputes and 
an adversarial process must allow each party to advance its 
position,however, may or may not be necessary; this should be 
confirmed using social science data. 
The specific determinations, however, need not, and cannot, be made 
at this point. The biggest procedural hurdle to the appearance of fairness, 
and one that must likely be addressed first, is the dubious practice of self­
recusal. One of the most important procedural questions when it comes 
to recusal is the question of who should decide recusal motions: the 
impugned judge, another judge of the same court, a group of judges, or 
243. Judges are often frustrated by what they perceive as frivolous recusal requests, and this 
problem would be exacerbated if judges were forced to defend themselves in a proceeding from such
charges. 
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some other party. The issue of self-recusal has been perhaps the most 
criticized aspect of American recusal rules and procedures.244 When one 
looks at recusal procedure from the appearance-based perspective, the 
flaws inherent in a system where a potentiallybiased judge is assigned 
the task of ruling on her own recusal motion become immediately
apparent. First, the self-recusal procedure violates the fundamental 
principle that one should not be a judge in herown cause. Furthermore, 
the practice leads attorneys to abstain from making a recusal motion
because of a fear of judicial retribution. Finally, a judge deciding her 
own recusal motion may not acknowledge that she is biased, either 
because she does not recognize the bias, because she does not want to 
admit that she is biased, or because she does not want to admit that she 
engaged in conduct that created the appearance of bias. 
There is another advantage to focusing on appearances while setting
recusal procedures rather than leaving the appearance inquiry until the 
very end when the judge makes her recusal decision. It is the advantage 
of time—there is an opportunity to think about and conduct empirical 
research into what procedures create an appearance of impartiality, as 
opposed to when the case is already in front of the judge. When 
appearances are considered in creating recusal procedures, the burden of 
setting clear, consistent, and appearance-based recusal procedures will 
fall to state and federal legislatures.245 Judges are generally too hesitant 
to impose procedures that threaten the collegial relations with their 
colleagues. Judges rarely criticize a colleague for being biased or 
prejudiced, although they have anonymously acknowledged that their 
colleagues (but not them!) may be biased in favor of some litigants, 
especially those who helped them get elected.246 
Furthermore, considering appearances ex ante, before any case is 
actually pending, eliminates the opportunity for judges to consider the 
facts of the case in reaching a recusal decision. Once the decisionmaker 
knows the legal issue in question or the identities of the parties, she may
under- (or over-) appreciate whether her impartiality might reasonably be 
244. SeeSHAMAN & GOLDSCHMIDT, supra note 105, at 66–67; Leslie W. Abramson, Deciding 
Recusal Motions  Who Judges the Judges?, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 543, 561 (1994) (“The appearance of
partiality and the perils of self-serving statutory interpretation suggest that, to the extent logistically
feasible, another judge should preside over such motions.”); David K. Stott, Comment, Zero-Sum 
Judicial Elections  Balancing Free Speech and Impartiality Through Recusal Reform, 2009 BYU L. 
REV. 481, 500. 
245. SeeRaftery, supra note 224, at 766 (discussing the role that legislatures can and should
play in drafting recusal statutes and crafting recusal mechanisms). 
246. Pozen, supra note 110, at 290–91. 
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questioned. For example, a judge may be tempted to refuse to recuse 
herself in a case involving a cause important to the judge (for example, 
tort reform for a conservative judge or abortion for a liberal one). But if 
legislatures consider appearances in advance and implement appearance-
based recusal procedures, it may be more difficult for the underlying 
facts of the dispute to infiltrate the recusal decision. 
More importantly, just as I questioned the wisdom of allowing 
judges to apply the “reasonable person” standard to test the appearance
of their own conduct, judges are likewise not well-suited to set 
procedures for determining whether their own impartiality is in question.
This is in part because judges do not have the means that legislators have 
to determine which procedures create an appearance of impartiality. 
Judges have their own interests in mind,and these interests often conflict
with creating a recusal procedure that avoids the appearance of bias.
Judges should neither be setting the recusal procedures nor applying the 
recusal standards to themselves. In fact, to the extent that judges do have
control over either the recusal process or the outcome, they are not likely 
to appear impartial.247 
I conclude this Part by returning to the discussion of the substantive 
recusal standard and by reconsidering what the substantive recusal 
standard should entail. Earlier, I argued that the appearance-based 
standard in place now is not by itself sufficient to create an appearance of 
impartiality. But that, of course, is not an argument in favor of scrapping
the standard altogether. Rather, I believe legislatures must consider the 
substantive recusal standard just as they would recusal procedures and 
determine what standard is likely to foster an appearance of fairness. One 
should not assume that an appearance-based standard is best for 
appearances. As mentioned earlier, by lowering the threshold that parties
must meet to obtain recusal, more recusal motions will be filed and 
public confidence in the courts may suffer.248 Ultimately, just as the
247. One solution would be to create an independent office to review recusal-related 
decisions. The 112th Congress has suggested the creation of an Inspector General for the judicial 
branch. Judicial Transparency and Ethics Enhancement Act of 2011, H.R. 727, 112th Cong. § 1021 
(1st Sess. 2011). Although the office is intended to investigate misconduct and prevent “waste, 
fraud, and abuse” within the judiciary, an additional option may be to give it the power to review 
recusal decisions by federal judges. Id. § 1023(3). This procedural change may instill confidence in 
the public that judges are accountable for their recusal decisions. 
248. For example, in a recent West Virginia case, a litigant sought state supreme court justice 
Menis Ketchum’s recusal based on statements that he made in his election campaign. Jessica M. 
Karmasek, Ketchum Reverses Course, Recuses Himself, W. VA. REC., Sept. 28, 2010, available 
athttp://www.wvrecord.com/news/230005-ketchum-reverses-course-recuses-himself. After the judge 
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legislatures will need to determine which recusal procedures create an 
appearance of impartiality, they will also need to decide what substantive
recusal standard is best for judicial legitimacy and the reputation of the 
courts. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Recusal lies at the heart of our understanding of the role of the courts 
in a democracy. It is meant to ensure judicial independence and 
impartiality and to protect the legitimacy of the courts as well as the 
reputation of the judiciary. Without reforms to various aspects of recusal 
law, public confidence in the judiciary—the primary source of judicial 
legitimacy—will continue to wane. 
This Article suggests that the long-standing assumption that recusal 
completely restores the appearance of judicial impartiality and public
confidence in the courts may need reexamination. It is time to focus on 
the circumstances that lead to recusal as well as recusal procedures. By 
shifting the focus away from the substantive recusal standard and the 
actual recusal decision, we can begin to maximize the appearance of 
impartiality on a systemic basis. And by considering appearance ex ante, 
before problems arise, we can put in place ethics rules and recusal 
procedures that truly legitimize the judiciary and restore the people’s 
faith in the fairness of the American courts. 
denied the recusal motion, somebody leaked the decision to legal blogs, creating even greater 
controversy and drawing negative attention and publicity to the West Virginia courts. Id. This 
publicity ultimately led Justice Ketchum to recuse himself not because he believed his continued 
presence on the case violated the appearance of impartiality, but rather because he did not “want 
[the] Court to be publicly maligned.”Id. 
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